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I. Introduction
Traditional concepts concerning the law regarding employment
relationships of an indefinite duration have been the object of much
criticism in recent years. The source of this controversy stems from the
application of the so-called employment-at-will rule which provides
that employment relationships of this nature may be terminated by
either party at any time with or without notice or cause. To mitigate
the somewhat harsh effects of this rule, certain jurisdictions have
fashioned exceptions which allow suits for wrongful discharge based
on public policy considerations as well as implied contractual rights.
In addition, a number of commentaries on the subject have proposed
the adoption, either by statute or through case law, of various "just
cause" standards for discharge in lieu of the at-will rule to prevent
arbitrary and unjust dismissals.'
1. See generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Glendon and Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the
Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457
(1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Stat-
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The at-will rule, however, is not about to be abandoned. The
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the view
that employment relationships of an indefinite duration may be termi-
nated at any time without notice "for good cause, for no cause, or
even for cause morally wrong .... ," 2 Even those jurisdictions which
have recognized exceptions to the at-will rule are limiting the applica-
tion of these exceptions to clearly articulated public policy as ex-
pressed in federal or state law.
Courts also have examined the effect of statements of personnel
policy, whether oral or written, on an employer's ability to discharge
at-will employees. In some cases, courts have held that company
assurances of continued employment, absent "just cause" for termina-
tion, gave rise to a contractually enforceable right, even though the
employment was for an indefinite term. Similarly, company assur-
ances of personnel policy benefits such as severance pay, bonuses and
commissions have been held to constitute contractual offers capable of
acceptance by at-will employees.
This Article discusses the various approaches to the law regarding
at-will employment relationships. The rationale for the employment-
at-will rule, its exceptions and recent limitations on these exceptions
are examined. In addition, this Article analyzes the effect of personnel
policies on the at-will rule, and reviews the law concerning employee
rights to personnel benefits. Finally, this Article proposes the adoption




1. The English Rule
The law regarding employment relationships of an indefinite dura-
tion has its origins in the feudal doctrine of master and servant, a
ute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of
Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Employment at Will];
Comment, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Protecting at Will Employees]; Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively
Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Abusively Discharged Employees]; At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust
Dismissal, 36 N.Y.C.B.A. Rep. 170 (April 1981) [hereinafter cited as At-Will Em-
ployment]; Feerick, Erosion of Rule On Employment at Will, N.Y.L.J., November
7, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Feerick, Employment at Will, N.Y.L.J., November 2, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
2. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
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doctrine which viewed the master-servant relationship as one primar-
ily based on status rather than contract. 3  Under this doctrine, the
mutual rights and obligations of the parties were determined, for the
most part, by custom and public policy rather than by the will of the
parties. 4 The enactment in 1562 of the English Statute of Laborers5
reinforced the doctrine of master and servant by requiring certain
classes of persons to accept employment.6 Nevertheless, the statute
also introduced the concept that terminations of employment had to
be effectuated by notice and that apprentices could be discharged only
"on reasonable cause." ' 7
During the nineteenth century, contractual concepts began to rede-
fine the law of master and servant. The rule emerged under the
English common law that a general hiring for an unspecified duration
was presumed to be a hiring for a one-year period.8 As the rule
3. For an historical discussion of the employment-at-will rule, see generally Fein-
man, supra note 1, at 119-22; Glendon and Lev, supra note 1, at 458; Summers,
supra note 1, at 484-85; Employment at Will, supra note 1, at 212-13; Protecting at
Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1824-28; Abusively Discharged Employee, supra
note 1, at 1438-39; At-Will Employment, supra note 1, at 171-73; Feerick, Employ-
ment at Will, N.Y.L.J., October 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
4. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, -. , 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920,
modified, 117 Cal. App. 3d 520a (1981), citing P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123 (1969). The feudal doctrine of master and servant extended
into the nineteenth century. Under this essentially paternalistic doctrine, the servant
was obligated to work for and obey his master's authority, while the master, in
return, was responsible for the servant's general welfare. 116 Cal. App. 3d at -, 171
Cal. Rptr. at 920-21, citing SELZNICK at 124-25, 128. See also 1 C. LABATT, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 251 (2d ed. 1913).
5. 5 Eliz., c. 4 (1562). Even though the statute was finally repealed in 1875 by the
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 38 and 39 Vict. c. 86, § 17, its influence
continues to be of importance with respect to the English common law principles of
termination by notice and dismissal for cause. See Employment at Will, supra note 1,
at 213 n.ll.
6. Summers, supra note 1, at 485.
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (1878).
8. Feerick, supra note 3, at 1; LABATT, supra note 4, § 156; see, e.g., Fawcett v.
Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K.B. 1834). Where an individual continued to work for
an employer after the expiration of the one year period, the employment relationship
was then terminable only at the end of an additional year. See also Beeston v.
Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827) ("If a master hire a servant, without
mention of time, that is a general hiring for a year, and if the parties go on four, five
or six years, a jury would be warranted in presuming a contract for a year in the first
instance, and so on for each succeeding year, as long as it should please the parties:
such a contract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is
not necessary to authenticate it."); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335, 340 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security]. Moreover, a showing of just cause was required for dismissal before the
end of the implied one-year term. LABATT, supra note 4, § 183; C. SMITH, LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT 37, 112 (7th ed. C. Knowles 1922). See generally Annot., 93
A.L.R.3d 659, 662 (1979).
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evolved, an employment relationship, unless otherwise specified,
could be terminated only by notice according to the custom in the
trade or, in the absence of such custom, by reasonable notice. Sum-
mary dismissals for cause, however, were excepted from these notice
requirements."
2. Development of the American Rule
Although the English rule found some acceptance in American
jurisdictions, 0 certain courts in this country often looked to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the employment relationship in deciding
whether to assign a definite contract term to that relationship while
others applied the traditional employment-at-will rule." By the lat-
9. Summers, supra note 1, at 485.
10. See generally Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, supra note 8, at 340
n.48. Through the years, some American courts have continued to adhere to the
English rule that an employment agreement specifying an employee's compensation
for a specific period of time amounts to a hiring for that time period. See, e.g., Chas.
S. Stifft Co. v. Florsheim, 203 Ark. 1043, 159 S.W.2d 748 (1942) (court held that
where the duration of an employment contract is not specified, a hiring at a specific
rate or sum per year will be construed as a hiring for the entire year); Putnam v.
Producers' Live Stock Marketing Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934) (plain-
tiff's hiring at yearly salary implied employment for one year); Dallas Hotel Co. v.
Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (Texas rule was that, in the absence
of special circumstances, an employment at a named sum per week, per month or per
year was a definite hiring for that pay period); accord, Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus
Co., 354 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); San Antonio v. Condie, 329 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See also Moline Lumber Co. v. Harrison, 128 Ark. 260, 194
S.W. 25 (1917); Rosenberger v. Pacific Coast Ry., 111 Cal. 313, 43 P. 963 (1896).
In Tennessee the courts are split as to whether the English rule should be applied to
employment relationships of an indefinite duration. Compare Delzell v. Pope, 200
Tenn. 641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1956) (hiring at a specified sum per week, per month or
per year is a hiring for such period in the absence of contrary circumstances) with
Garrison v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 55 Tenn. App. 419, 402 S.W.2d 462 (1965) (hiring at
a particular sum per week, per month or per year does not raise presumption that
employment was for such a term). See also O'Neill v. ARA Serv., Inc., 457 F. Supp.
182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1978), citing Slonaker v. P. G. Publishing Co., 338 Pa. 292, 13
A.2d 48 (1940) (a reasonable or definite period may be inferred by proof of the intent
of the parties, the surrounding circumstances, the situation of the parties, the objects
they had in view, and the nature of the subject-matter of the agreement); Russell &
Axon v. Handshoe, 176 So. 2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 188 So.
2d 317 (Fla. 1966) (although contract specifying amount of salary per month and per
year does not imply a definite term of employment, an employer can terminate the
employee only at the end of a monthly pay period); Shenn v. Fair-Tex Mills, Inc., 26
A.D.2d 282, 273 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1st Dep't 1966) (stipulation of wages for a time
period indicated a hiring for that period).
11. Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, supra note 8, at 341. See, e.g.,
Truesdale v. Young, 24 F. Cas. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (riverboat pilot's employment
was for an indefinite period and either party could freely withdraw from it); Payne
v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
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ter part of the nineteenth century, the employment-at-will rule em-
erged as the predominant American rule in wrongful discharge cases
as a direct result of H.G. Wood's treatise on master-servant relation-
ships." Offering only scant authority of questionable value to sup-
port his assertions,1 3 Wood stated without further analysis the follow-
ing rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A
hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that
it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time
the party may serve. 14
Despite the apparent lack of authority and analysis, Wood's rule
was incorporated into the American common law in Martin v. New
York Life Insurance Co.,' 5 a case involving the termination of an
employee hired at an annual salary. 16  Indeed, by the beginning of
Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915) (defendant-railroad could discharge its
employees at-will for buying goods from a certain merchant).
12. H.G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1886).
13. Id. § 136. Wood cited the following cases as authority for his rule on indefinite
hirings: Wilder v. United States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd, 80 U.S. 254 (1871)
(statute of limitations barred creditor's claim against debtor for payment of a larger
sum than agreed upon by debtor); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851) (new trial
granted on issue of whether defendant-innkeeper had right to eject forcefully plain-
tiff-barkeeper after notifying him of his discharge); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.,
106 Mass. 56 (1870) (court held that whether an oral employment contract was for a
year or for a quarter of a year was to be a question of fact for the jury and that the
statute of frauds did not bar an action by the employee for payment of wages during
the second year of employment); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871)
(court affirmed jury verdict for plaintiff-employee where jury found that parties
intended hiring to be for a definite period of one year and plaintiff was fired after
only eight months). These cases appear to have been decided entirely on their facts
and none stand squarely for the general proposition that an indefinite hiring is
terminable at-will.
14. WOOD, supra note 12, § 136.
15. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). The court established that a hiring at an
annual salary does not make the employment for a year; rather, an employee hired at
such a salary was an employee-at-will and the employer was at liberty to terminate
him at any time.
16. In adopting Wood's rule, the court in Martin stated:
The decisions on this point in the lower courts have not been uniform,
but we think the rule is correctly stated by Mr. Wood and it has been
adopted in a number of states ....
It follows, therefore, that the hiring of the plaintiff was a hiring at will
and the defendant was at liberty to terminate the same at any time.
148 N.Y. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417 (citation omitted).
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the twentieth century, Wood's rule had become the primary authority
with respect to the termination of employment relationships of an
indefinite duration. 7
3. Rationale for the American Rule
The underlying rationale for the employment-at-will rule has been
attributed to the principles of freedom of contract, freedom of enter-
prise, and mutuality of obligation. Concerning the principles of free-
dom of contract and freedom of enterprise, the United States Supreme
Court in Adair v. United States'8 stated:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of
labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such
labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right of the em-
ployee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is
the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to
dispense with the services of such employee .... 19
Accordingly, the Court in Adair held that the right to discharge
employees at will cannot be limited by federal legislation, because
such legislation would be repugnant to the fifth amendment guaran-
tees of personal liberty and liberty of contract. 20 The Court reasoned
that by increasing the freedom of the employer to hire and fire em-
ployees and restricting its liability, the employment-at-will rule fur-
thered economic growth and entrepreneurship. 2'
17. Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, supra note 8, at 342.
18. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional §
10 of the Erdman Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424, a statute which imposed
criminal penalties for the discharge or threatened discharge of interstate railroad
employees because of union membership. The Court held that the statute was
repugnant to the fifth amendment mandate that no person shall be deprived of
liberty or property without due process of law.
Subsequently, in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), state legislation similar to
the Erdman Act met the same fate under the Court's construction of the fourteenth
amendment. In Coppage the state statute provided that it was a misdemeanor,
punishable by fine or imprisonment, for an employer to require any of its employees
to agree not to become or remain a member of any labor organization during the
course of his employment. Id. at 6-7.
19. 208 U.S.at 174-75.
20. Id. Indeed, the Court stated: "In all such particulars the employer and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally
justify in a free land." Id.
21. See generally Feinman, supra note 1, at 131-35; Vernon and Gray, Termina-
tion at Will-The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EMP. REL. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1980);
Protecting at Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1826; Abusively Discharged Em-
19811
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The contractual doctrine of mutuality of obligation also has been
cited as support for the at-will rule.22  Under this doctrine, courts
have reasoned that the right of an employee to quit his employment at
any time, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer
to discharge the employee at any time, for whatever reason. As such,
these courts have recognized that the employee's right to quit provides
the consideration for the employer's right to fire the employee.2 3
A policy consideration which supports the American rule is the
belief that an employee should not be bound to a position to the extent
that he would be precluded from obtaining a better job elsewhere. In
adhering to this rationale, one court stated:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services perma-
nently, thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving
his condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be
against public policy and the spirit of our institutions that any man
should thus handicap himself.... 24
B. Application of the Employment-At-Will Rule
In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, the American rule
has come to provide that a hiring for an indefinite term amounts to an
employment-at-will which may be terminated at any time with or
without cause by either party.2 5 Under this rule, the specification of
ployee, supra note 1, at 1440; Comment, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The
Employee at Will Relationship in Massachusetts, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 285, 286-88
(1980-81).
22. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967);
Summers, supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-78 (1908); Meadows v.
Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.
2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d
272 (1978); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 137 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
24. Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate Inc., 174 La. 66, 67, 139 So. 760, 761
(1932). See also Note, Contracts-Employee's Discharge Motivated by Bad Faith,
Malice, or Retaliation Constitutes a Breach of an Employment Contract Terminable
at Will, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 300, 302 (1974) (suggesting that an employment
contract is merely an offer looking to a series of unilateral contracts which the
employee accepts when he performs the requested services and that when the em-
ployer discharges an employee, it is simply withdrawing a revocable offer).
25. The American rule that an employment for an indefinite term may be termi-
nated at any time with or without cause by either an employer or employee is well
settled in the following jurisdictions: Alabama: Summers v. Ralston Purina Co., 260
Ala. 166, 69 So. 2d 858 (1954); Arkansas: Miller v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 225
Ark. 475, 283 S.W.2d 158 (1955); California: Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d
549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964); Connecticut: Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146
[Vol. X
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an employee's pay for a specific time period, unlike the English rule,
does not raise a presumption of employment for that period. In the
absence of a written agreement to the contrary, an employer may
discharge an employee hired for an indefinite term at any time with-
out cause and without notice. Conversely, an employee may quit his
employment at any time without cause or notice, unless a written
agreement provides otherwise.26
The employment-at-will rule has withstood numerous challenges
since its inception. Dismissals have been upheld under the at-will rule
where employees have reported employer kickbacks,27 refused the
sexual advances of their employer, 28 refused to take psychological
Conn. 627, 153 A.2d 426 (1959); Delaware: Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330 (Del.
1973); District of Columbia: Sullivan v. Heritage Foundation, 399 A.2d 856 (D.C.
1979); Florida: Wynne v. Ludman Corp., 79 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1955); Georgia:
Wilkinson v. Trust Co. of Georgia Associates, 128 Ga. App. 473, 197 S.E.2d 146
(1973); Illinois: Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355
(1959); Indiana: Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975);
Iowa: Stauter v. Walnut Grove Products, 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971); Kansas:
Lorson v. Falcon Coach, Inc., 214 Kan. 670, 522 P.2d 449 (1974); Kentucky:
Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, 313 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1958); Louisiana: Pechon v.
National Corp. Serv., Inc., 234 La. 397, 100 So. 2d 213 (1958); Maryland: Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Murray, 198 Md. 526, 84 A.2d 870 (1951); Massachu-
setts: Askinas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 330 Mass. 103, 111 N.E.2d 740 (1953);
Michigan: McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1959) (applying
Michigan law); Missouri: Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406, cert. denied, 381 U.S.
929 (1965); New Jersey: Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d 24
(1958); New York: Parker, v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d
297 (1959); North Carolina: Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971);
New Mexico: Garza v. United Child Care, Inc., 88 N.M. 30, 536 P.2d 1086 (Ct.
App. 1975); Ohio: Henkel v. Educational Research Council of Am., 45 Ohio St. 2d
249, 74 Ohio Ops. 2d 415, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976); Oklahoma: Sooner Broadcasting
Co. v. Grotkop, 280 P.2d 457 (Okla. 1955); Pennsylvania: Fawcett v. Monongahela
R.R., 391 Pa. 134, 137 A.2d 768 (1958); Rhode Island: School Comm. of Providence
v. Board of Regents for Educ., 112 R.I. 288, 308 A.2d 788 (1973); Tennessee: McCall
v. Oldenburg, 53 Tenn. App. 300, 382 S.W.2d 537 (1964); Texas: NHA, Inc. v.
Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Utah: Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Virginia: Plaskitt v. Black Diamond
Trailer Co., 209 Va. 460, 164 S.E.2d 645 (1968); Washington: Webster v. Schauble,
65 Wash. 2d 849, 400 P.2d 292 (1965); West Virginia: State ex rel. Lippert v. Sims,
143 W. Va. 542, 103 S.E.2d 533 (1958); Wisconsin: Kovachik v. American Auto
Ass'n, 5 Wis. 2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254 (1958); Wyoming: Lukens v. Goit, 430 P.2d 607
(Wyo. 1967).
26. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 684 (1961); 9 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 1017 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958).
27. Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979).
28. Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1980). The New York court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that her
discharge violated a state public policy as required by Chin v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979), see notes 172-73 and 255-57 infra
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stress tests,29 filed workmen compensation claims, 30 indicated their
availability for jury duty, 31 refused to support political candidates
favored by their employer, 32 filed unemployment insurance claims,33
expressed concern about the safety of the employer's product, 34 and
filed complaints with governmental regulatory agencies concerning
allegedly improper conduct by their employers. 35 Courts also have
applied the at-will rule to employment contracts alleged to be for a
permanent 36 or otherwise definite duration 37 where such contracts
were not supported by sufficient consideration 3s or were unenforce-
able under the statute of frauds.39
1. Permanent Employment Contracts
Most courts agree that, in the absence of sufficient consideration,
contracts for permanent employment are terminable at-will. An em-
ployee's continued services generally are not considered sufficient to
support a contract for permanent employment. 40  Nevertheless, some
and accompanying text. Although plaintiff alleged that defendant had discharged
her in violation of New York's public policy regarding sex discrimination, the court
found that she had failed to establish a viable cause of action under the applicable
state or federal statutes prohibiting such discrimination. 106 Misc. 2d at 570, 435
N.Y.S.2d at 1011. Compare Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) with Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1979).
29. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
30. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
31. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
32. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
33. Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
34. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
35. Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E.
342 (1928); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
37. Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 I11. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1959).
38. Buian v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970).
39. See notes 42, 46 infra and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980) (employee's
continued services did not support contract for permanent or otherwise definite
duration terminable only for "just cause"); Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co.,
249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E. 342 (1928) ("permanent employment" is not lifetime employ-
ment but is in fact indefinite employment); Greenberg v. Jerome H. Resnick & Co.,
230 N.Y. 70, 129 N.E. 211 (1920) (where contract for permanent employment creates
a confidential relationship, such as attorney-client, courts will sometimes allow an
employer to terminate an employee at any time without cause); Carfizzi v. United
Transp. Co., 20 A.D.2d 707, 247 N.Y.S.2d 162 (2d Dep't 1964) (no cause of action
allowed for breach of alleged contract for lifetime employment); Justice v. Stanley
Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974) (court held that even if a
contract specifying a starting salary of $12,000 per year was deemed to be an
agreement for "permanent employment," such agreement would not establish a term
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courts have found that an employer's right to terminate may be
limited by consideration given by an employee in addition to the
services to be rendered under the contract. An employment-at-will
coupled with such consideration, or interest, may support a contract
for permanent employment. 41 Oral contracts for permanent employ-
ment, however, may be unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 42
Recent decisions illustrate the approaches courts have taken to de-
termine whether sufficient consideration was given to support a con-
tract for permanent employment. In Rowe v. Noren Pattern &
Foundry Co.,43 for example, plaintiff-employee, who was within one
and one-half years of having his pension vest at his prior job, was
induced to take on new employment with the defendant-employer.
of employment for one year in the absence of special circumstances or an express
stipulation as to the duration of employment); Campion v. Boston & Main R.R., 269
Mass. 579, 169 N.E. 499 (1930) (where employee worked for two years and then was
fired, court held that despite the advertisement for "permanent employment" the
employer could discharge the employee at any time it no longer desired the em-
ployee's services); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587
(1967) (no contract for permanent employment where the employee furnishes no
additional consideration and consents to an indefinite hiring at will). See also Im-
plied Contract Rights to Job Security, supra note 8, at 345; Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226
(1974).
41. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(presumption that a contract for indefinite period is terminable at will may be
rebutted by proof that employee gave additional consideration); Rabago-Alvarez v.
Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976) (employment-at-
will coupled with an interest for consideration other than services to be rendered is
intended to continue for a reasonable time and cannot be terminated at-will);
Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 139, 149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845, 852
(1975) ("a detriment, in the form of removal of a family and foregoing of other
business and contacts, if bargained for, will constitute sufficient consideration to
support a contract for permanent employment"). But see Vernon and Gray, supra
note 21, at 38 (discussing the difficulty in proving that consideration requires en-
forcement of an at-will agreement).
42. See, e.g., Lauter v. W & J Sloane, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(where three-year contract was unenforceable under statute of frauds, employee was
terminable at-will and had no cause of action for tortious interference with employ-
ment by inducing termination); Vassallo v. Texaco, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 642, 422
N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1979) (an oral commitment to employ a person so long as his
work was satisfactory was unenforceable under statute of frauds because it could not
be performed within one year); Chase v. United States Hosp., 60 A.D.2d 558, 400
N.Y.S.2d 343 (1st Dep't 1977) (where plaintiff attempted to prove by parol evidence
that his employment contract was intended to be for two years, the court held that
statute of frauds rendered any oral promises void and unenforceable); Supplee v.
Hallanan, 14 Misc. 2d 658, 179 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd, 8
A.D.2d 708, 185 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1st Dep't 1959); Harris v. Home Indem. Co., 16
Misc. 2d 586, 190 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), af'd, 6 A.D.2d 861,
175 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1st Dep't 1958); Houston v. American Surety Co., 57 N.Y.S.2d
290 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
43. 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979).
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Plaintiff was promised that after forty-five days of service he would
become a union member after which he could be fired only for "just
cause" and that, in any event, he would be laid-off only if the com-
pany closed down. 44 After forty-three days of employment with the
defendant, plaintiff's employment was summarily terminated. The
trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant after the close
of the plaintiff's case on the grounds that the employment "contract
(1) was for more than one year and therefore was in violation of the
statute of frauds, and (2) was a contract for permanent employment
which, under Michigan law, is a contract at will terminable with or
without cause by either party at any time. ' 45
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's directed
verdict and remanded the action. The court held that the statute of
frauds was not violated, because plaintiff's contract of employment
could have been for less than one year as a result of either the plant
closing or his discharge for just cause. 46  In any event, the court
reasoned that plaintiff's relinquishment of his soon-to-vest pension
benefits "constituted a reliance sufficient to circumvent the statute of
frauds, at least by raising a question of fact to be resolved by the
jury." 47
In rendering its decision, the appellate court affirmed the general
rule in Michigan that contracts for permanent employment are termi-
44. Id. at 256-57, 283 N.W.2d at 715.
45. Id. at 256, 283 N.W.2d at 714. The trial court relied on Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429, 262 N.W.2d 848 (1977). For a discussion of
Toussaint, see notes 263-66 infra and accompanying text.
46. 91 Mich. App. at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. With respect to the statute of
frauds issue, the court stated:
Where an oral contract may be completed in less than a year, even
though it is clear that in all probability the contract will extend for a
period of years, the statute of frauds is not violated. Fothergill v. McKay
Press, 361 Mich. 666, 668; 106 N.W.2d 215 (1960), quoted with approval
the following language from Smalley v. Mitchell, 110 Mich. 650, 652; 68
N.W. 978 (1896):
"The mere fact that the contract may or may not be performed within
the year does not bring it within the statute. The rule is that if, by any
possibility, it is capable of being completed within a year, it is not within
the statute, though the parties may have intended and thought it probable
that it would extend over a longer period, and though it does so extend."
(Emphasis added.)
Id.
47. Id., citing Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix, Inc., 44 Mich. App. 416, 419-20,
205 N.W.2d 504, 506 (1973); Conel Dev., Inc. v. River Rouge Sav. Bank, 84 Mich.
App. 415, 423, 269 N.W.2d 621, 625 (1978).
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nable at will, but also noted that "because the rule is sometimes harsh
and offers opportunities for arbitrary dismissal, the courts have been
quick to find exceptions. ' 4  Accordingly, the appellate court found
that plaintiff would not have left his prior job without the promise of
obtaining the protection of a union contract and that this was "a
meaningful and significant factor" absent in those Michigan cases
which adhered to the general rule. 49  The court also relied on an
exception to the general rule, recognized by another jurisdiction, that
the at-will doctrine should not be followed when a tenured or secured
position is surrendered. 50  Because the court found that plaintiff had
relinquished his assured pension and position with his former em-
ployer to accept a job with the defendant, it applied the exception. 5'
A different result was reached in Gonzales v. United Southwest
National Bank of Santa Fe,52 in which the Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that the performance of duties and payment of wages was
not sufficient consideration to support a contract for lifetime employ-
ment. In that case, plaintiff-employee claimed that he could be dis-
charged only for "good cause" because his original written employ-
ment agreement with the defendant provided for lifetime or
permanent employment on the condition that he competently per-
form his duties. 53 The court rejected plaintiff's contentions finding
48. 91 Mich. App. at 258, 283 N.W.2d at 715. With respect to permanent employ-
ment contracts, the court stated:
In Michigan, as well as in a majority of states, the rule is well estab-
lished that, in the absence of some special consideration passing from the
employee to the employer, other than the services to be performed by the
employee, a contract for employment for an indefinite term is a contract
which may be terminated at any time by either party for any reason or for
no reason at all .... Further, in a majority of jurisdictions, relinquish-
ment by the employee of a job, business or profession in order to accept the
new position of permanent employment does not constitute special consid-
eration sufficient to support the contract.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 139,
124 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1975) (consideration for permanent employment was supplied by
employee's removal of his family from Minnesota to California as bargained for by
the parties).
49. 91 Mich. App. at 262, 283 N.W.2d at 717. See Percival v. General Motors
Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120
(6th Cir. 1959); Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687
(1938); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937); Milligan v.
Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 274 N.W.2d 10 (1978).
50. See Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
51. 91 Mich. App. at 263, 283 N.W.2d at 717.
52. 93 N.M. 522, 602 P.2d 619 (1979).
53. Id. at 524, 602 P.2d at 621. Plaintiff had a written contract of employment for
a three-year term with an option to renew which the court determined had expired
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that there was no consideration for a promise of permanent employ-
ment. The contract, therefore, was for an indefinite duration, termi-
nable at the will of either party with or without cause. 54 The court
interpreted the word "permanent" in plaintiff's contract to mean that
his employment was steady as opposed to temporary or part-time. 55
2. Contracts for a Definite Term
Whether an employment relationship constitutes a hiring for a
definite term and is thus exempt from the application of the employ-
ment-at-will rule also may depend on the existence of sufficient con-
sideration and the facts of the case. Where an employment contract is
for a stated term, "just cause" is generally required for termination
prior to the expiration date of the contract. 56 A "just cause" require-
ment removes the right of an employer to discharge employees arbi-
trarily. 57 Some courts, however, have construed "just cause" require-
prior to his termination. Based on this fact, the court also determined that the
plaintiff did not have an arbitrable dispute. Id. at 524, 602 P.2d at 620-21.
54. Id. at 524, 602 P.2d at 621. With respect to the law of "permanent employ-
ment",in New Mexico, the court quoted the following:
"The rule is uniform that a contract for permanent employment, not
supported by any consideration other than performance of duties and
payment of wages, is a contract for an indefinite period. It is terminable at
the will of either party. A discharge without cause does not constitute a
breach of such contract justifying recovery of damages. (Citations omit-
ted.)"
"Where a contract for permanent employment provides additional con-
sideration, the eiployee can recover damages for his discharge when
made without just cause. (Citations omitted.)"
"In the instant case, there is no evidence that any consideration, other
than employment and payment of wages, was given by defendant to
plaintiffs."
Id. at 524, 602 P.2d at 621, quoting Garza v. United Child Care, Inc., 88 N.M. 30,
31, 536 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Ct. App. 1975).
55. 93 N.M. at 524, 602 P.2d at 621. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument
that the statute of frauds was inapplicable to the instant case or that, in the alterna-
tive, the defendant should be estopped from asserting it as a defense.
56. See, e.g., Alan N. Alpern v. Lawrence N. Hurwitz, Civ. No. 80-7722, 80-7732
(2d Cir., Mar. 19, 1981) (court held that "just cause" was required to relieve
defendant of liability for payments where defendant hired plaintiff-attorney for a
definite term to serve as a financial consultant and defendant stopped payment
before the end of the term but plaintiff kept sending bills to defendant); Crane v.
Perfect Film & Chem. Corp., 38 A.D.2d 288, 329 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't 1972) ("just
cause" required for an employer to discharge an employee under an employment
contract for stated term).
57. Levine v. Zerfuss Offset Plate Serv. Co., 492 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In
re Brooks, 135 Vt. 563, 382 A.2d 204 (1977).
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ments quite liberally in favor of the employer in situations of extreme
economic necessity. 58
In Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co.59 plaintiff-employee claimed that
he was wrongfully terminated from his employment by the defendant
based on a personnel manual termination policy which plaintiff al-
leged created an employment contract for a definite period of at least
one year. Under the policy in question, the defendant made annual
performance appraisals of its employees. Plaintiff asserted that the
defendant's failure to follow the provisions of its termination policy in
discharging him was a breach of the alleged one-year contract.6 0
In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the court rea-
soned that "the termination policy at issue was a unilateral expression
of defendant's policy and procedure, was issued and revised after
plaintiff's employment, its terms were not bargained for between
parties, and thus no employment contract was created thereby." 6' 1
Accordingly, the court held that the annual performance review pol-
icy did not create an employment contract for a definite term.6 2
In Mann v. Ben Tire Distributors, Ltd.61 plaintiff-employee
claimed that certain documents given to employees and promises
made by the defendant created a contract for a one-year period and,
as such, plaintiff's summary discharge violated that agreement. The
documents in question provided for a bonus calculated on an annual
basis and the promises made by the defendant's general manager
concerned an annual review of employees.6 4
58. Under New York law, extreme economic necessity has been held to be a "just
cause" for termination in public sector cases. See, e.g., Schwab v. Bowen, 41 N.Y.2d
907, 363 N.E.2d 341, 394 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1977) (collective bargaining agreement did
not bar discharge because of extreme economic necessity); accord, Osoba v. City of
Beacon, 57 A.D.2d 588, 393 N.Y.S.2d 596 (2d Dep't 1977); Delury v. City of New
York, 51 A.D.2d 288, 381 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep't 1976) (city can discharge sanita-
tionmen in fiscal crisis despite collective bargaining agreement). See also Fairview
School Dist. v. Fairview Educ. Ass'n, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 366, 368 A.2d 842 (1977)
(termination without using efficiency ratings to determine employee's efficiency did
not lack just cause under collective bargaining agreement).
59. Civ. No. 80-A-1002 (D. Colo., Feb. 5, 1981).
60. Id., slip op. at 1.
61. Id., slip op. at 2-3, citing Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52,
551 P.2d 779 (1976). For a discussion of employee contractual rights under personnel
policy manuals, see notes 250-89 infra and accompanying text.
62. Civ. No. 80-A-1002, slip op. at 3; accord, Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co,
96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d
791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979) (employer's "code of conduct" manual did not
constitute an employment contract for a definite term).
63. 89 111. App. 3d 695, 411 N.E.2d 1235 (1980).
64. Id. at 696, 411 N.E.2d at 1236. The document essential to plaintiff's case was
an in-house memorandum which commenced as follows: "This letter is to set forth
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In affirming the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant, the
court in Mann stated that the date used for calculating bonuses was
merely a "rational basis" for determining whether a bonus was due at
all and that the promise of the annual review was but one factor to be
considered in deciding whether a contract for a definite period ex-
isted. 65 The Mann court distinguished Grauer v. Valve & Primer
Corp.,"" where it was held that a guaranteed minimum salary of
$22,500 coupled with a promise of an annual review created a one-
year contract, on the grounds that no such guaranty existed in the
instant case. 7 Accordingly, plaintiff's employment was deemed to be
at-will.
III. Statutory Limitations on the Employment-At-Will Rule
As a result of the various statutory limitations placed on the em-
ployment-at-will rule, the principle of "freedom of contract" no
longer justifies an employer's absolute right to terminate employees
hired for an indefinite duration with or without cause and at any
time. The first major break with the common law doctrine of the
at-will rule occurred with the passage of the Railway Labor Act
("RLA")68 in 1926. The provisions of the RLA were designed to
prevent employer interference with the right of employees to select
bargaining representatives of their own choosing without the threat of
discharge or other punitive action being taken against them.69 The
forth the details of salary and bonus arrangement for you for the period 1-1-75
through 12-31-75." Id.
65. Id. at 697, 411 N.E.2d at 1237.
66. 47 Ill. App. 3d 152, 361 N.E.2d 863 (1977).
67. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 698, 411 N.E.2d at 1237.
68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976). In 1936 the RLA was amended to "cover every
common carriers by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce .... " Act of
April 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1976)).
69. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1976). The concepts of interference, influence and
coercion under the RLA were explained by the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), as
follows:
The intent of Congress is clear with respect to the sort of conduct that is
prohibited. "Interference" with freedom of action and "coercion" refer to
well understood concepts of the law. The meaning of the word "influence"
in this clause may be gathered from the context. Noscitur a sociis. Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519. The use of the word is not to be taken as
interdicting the normal relations and innocent communications which are
a part of all friendly intercourse, albeit between employer and employee.
"Influence" in this context plainly means pressure, the use of the authority
or power of either party to induce action by the other in derogation of
what the statute calls "self-organization". The phrase covers the abuse of
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1930 United States Supreme Court decision in Texas & New Orleans
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks7 ° in
effect rejected Adair v. United States by recognizing the congressional
power under the Commerce Clause to guarantee workers the right to
organize and bargain collectively without the threat of discharge or
coercion. Texas & New Orleans Railroad thus cleared the way for
future legislation designed to protect the rights of employees.
In 1935 the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 71 was enacted
to provide other employees with the right to organize, bargain collec-
tively and "engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... ,,72 Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits employers from interfering with,
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of these rights. 73
The "mutual aid or protection" language of section 7 of the NLRA
protects employees in both organized and unorganized shops irrespec-
tive of whether union activity is involved or collective bargaining is
contemplated.
relation or opportunity so as to corrupt or override the will, and it is no
more difficult to appraise conduct of this sort in connection with the
selection of representatives for the purpose of this Act than in relation to
well-known applications of the law with respect to fraud, duress and
undue influence.
Id. at 568 (emphasis added). See also Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300
U.S. 515, 543 (1937) ("The prohibition against such interference was continued and
made more explicit by the amendment of 1934.").
70. 281 U.S. 548 (1930). In Texas & New Orleans R.R. the carrier decided to
discharge its unionized employees and deal only with a newly-created company
union. The carrier justified its actions on the grounds that the RLA was unconstitu-
tional in that the statute violated its rights under the first and fifth amendments to
manage its property, including the selection and discharge of employees, as it saw fit.
Id. at 558.
71. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449. In 1947 the NLRA, or the Wagner
Act, was significantly amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, Act of June 23, 1947, ch.
120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136-52. In adopting the NLRA, Congress found "inequality of
bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association
or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association .. " National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of the
NLRA in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941), and NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937), rejected the holdings of
Adair v. United States and Coppage v. Kansas that legislation cannot constitutionally
limit the principle of freedom of contract.
72. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
73. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
74. The "mutual aid or protection" language of § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), has
been held to cover employee protests concerning wages, Salt River Valley Water
Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); supervisory policies, NLRB v.
Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976); working conditions, Pleasant View
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The provisions of the NLRA also protect employees from discrimi-
natory discharges based on union animus. Under section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, 75 it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate in regard to
hiring, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employ-
ment in order to encourage or discourage union membership.76  Nev-
ertheless, discriminatory conduct will violate section 8(a)(3) only
when it is motivated by union animus and has "the foreseeable effect
of either encouraging or discouraging union membership." 77 An em-
Rest Home, 194 N.L.R.B. 426 (1971); and health and safety violations, Detroit
Forming, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 205 (1973). Even concerted employee activity of a
political nature is protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556
(1978). Despite the statutory exclusion of supervisors from the protection of the
NLRA, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), the National Labor Relations Board has
held that the discharge of a supervisor will be unlawful where it is "part of a pattern
of conduct aimed at coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights .. "
DRW Corp. d/b/a Brothers Three Cabinets, 248 N.L.R.B. 828, 829 (1980); accord,
Empire Gas, Inc. of Denver, 254 N.L.R.B. 76 (1981); see generally Feerick, Supervi-
sory Discharges, N.Y.L.J., May 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
75. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
76. See, e.g., Republic Die & Tool Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 92, 105 L.R.R.M. 1644
(1980) (employer violated § 8(a)(3) by discharging employee who won arbitration
case which reinstated the employee with 10 months back pay); Reinaver v. Fuel
Transp. Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. 210, 105 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1980) (employer unlawfully
discharged an employee who allegedly refused overtime work where employer knew
of the employee's union activities prior to the discharge and had never disciplined
any other employee for refusing such work); Carbonex Coal Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 779
(1980) (employer unlawfully laid-off 18 employees allegedly for economic reasons
where evidence showed that employer had kept track of which employees were union
supporters).
Similar protection against discriminatory discharges of employees for union sup-
port is also afforded by state law. In New York State, for example, it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer: "To encourage membership in any company union or
discourage membership in any labor organization, by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure or in any term or conditions of employment .. " N.Y. LAB. LAW § 704(5)
(McKinney 1976). Other states affording such protection include Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-105(5) (1972); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
150A, § 4(3) (West 1976); Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 423.16 (1978); and
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(1)(c) (Purdon 1964).
77. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 (Carl A. Palmer), 208 N.L.R.B. 356, 356
(1974). Concerning unlawful discrimination in violation of § 8(a)(3), the United
States Supreme Court in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954),
stated:
The language of § 8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is
for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of
discrimination. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or
discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is
accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw
discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encour-
ages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed.
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ployer's discriminatory conduct, however, may violate the provisions
of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA without a showing of unlawful motiva-
tion where that conduct is considered to be "inherently destructive" of
its employees' rights. 78 Otherwise, "[i]n the absence of a showing of
anti-union motivation, an employer may discharge an employee for a
good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at all."7
Another major statutory break with the employment-at-will rule
occurred with the passage of various equal employment laws.80 With
In Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 150, 105 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1980), enforced, 92 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 12,987 (1st Cir. 1981), the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"),
set forth the causation test it will use in determining whether employer conduct
violates § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977), the NLRB will apply the following test in § 8(a)(3) cases:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a
"motivating factor" in the employer's decision. Once this is established,
the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.
251 N.L.R.B. at -, 105 L.R.R.M. at 1175 (footnote omitted). Despite its enforce-
ment of the NLRB's order, the First Circuit disagreed with the Board over the exact
nature of the burden which an employer acquires once a prima facie case is estab-
lished by General Counsel. In contrast to the NLRB, the court reasoned that the
ultimate burden of persuasion should always remain with the General Counsel. 92
Lab. Cas. at 18,590-91. Where a violation of § 8(a)(3) is established, the NLRB may
provide for reinstatement with back pay for an unlawfully discharged employee. See,
e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1980) (NLRB did not abuse
its wide-discretion by ordering the reinstatement with back pay of an employee).
78. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1967); NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963). The National Labor Relations
Board has characterized an employer's conduct as "inherently destructive" in a
number of cases. See, e.g., Moore Business Forms, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 393, 408,
modified on other grounds, 226 N.L.R.B. 688 (1976), enforced in part, 574 F.2d 835
(5th Cir. 1978) (characterization of returning strikers as new employees for insurance
purposes); Cutten Supermarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507, 510 (1975) (withholding accrued
vacation benefits from strikers); Ross Sand Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 915 (1975) (withhold-
ing "bonus" payment from strikers).
79. Borin Packing Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 280, 281 (1974). Nevertheless, 80% of the
collective bargaining agreements subject to the provisions of the NLRA contain
provisions that employees may be discharged only for "cause" or "just cause," while
specific grounds for discharge are found in 65 % of these agreements. Many collective
bargaining agreements contain both general and specific provisions relating to dis-
charge. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS § 40:1 (BNA 1978).
Examples of specific grounds for discharge include violations of leave provisions,
dishonesty and theft, insubordination, unauthorized absence and failure to obey
safety rules. Id.
80. See generally Feerick, supra note 3, at 2; Summers, supra note 1, at 491-99;
Employment at Will, supra note 1, at 230-31.
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the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,81 Congress
provided protection against discharges based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. Subsequent federal legislation prohibited dis-
crimination in employment based on age 2 or physical handicap.8 3
Similar protection against discrimination in employment is found in
various state statutes and local ordinances.8 4 Nevertheless, even un-
der the provisions of federal and state equal employment laws, an
employer may discharge employees for "good reason, bad reason or no
reason at all absent discrimination.... 5
Employees are statutorily protected from discharge under several
so-called "whistle blower" statutes containing reinstatement and
back-pay provisions designed to encourage employees to report em-
ployer violations of the environmental or safety hazard standards
provided for in these laws. The federal statutes in question include the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,86 the Air Pollution Prevention
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1976). The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice
for employees "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Exceptions to this mandate, however, are made for bona fide
occupational requirements tied to religion, sex or national origin. Id. § 2000-e-
2(a)(1). Title VII is administered by a five-member Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission which may initiate court action if a complaint is not disposed of at the
state level or through voluntary compliance. Id. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5. The provisions
of Title VII provide that aggrieved employees may be reinstated with back pay if
they have been the object of an unlawful employment practice.ld. § 2000e-5(g).
82. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976
& Supp. 111978), (prohibiting age based discrimination against persons between the
ages of 40 and 70).
83. Vocational Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
84. The following state statutes prohibit discriminatory discharge on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex: see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220
(1974); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) (West Supp. 1975); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 292, 296
(McKinney 1980); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4-12.02(A) (Page 1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955 (Supp. 1974). The following state statutes prohibit discriminatory
discharge because of physical handicap: see, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K
(Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 292,
296 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1980-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7 (Supp. 1973);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1973).
85. Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D. Mo.
1974), af'd, 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (Supp. 111978), 29 C.F.R. Part 24 (1980). The Act provides
that no employer shall discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee who
has "assisted or participated, or is about to assist or participate in any manner in...
a proceeding [under the Act] or, in any other action to carry out the purposes of this
chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended." 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)-(3)
(1976). Remedies available to a discharged employee include reinstatement, back pay
and compensatory damages. In a recent action brought under the Energy Reorgani-
zation Act, Cotter v. Con Edison, Case No. 81-ERA-6 (Dep't of Labor, July 7, 1981)
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and Control Act,8 7 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 8 and the
Railroad Safety Act.8 Similarly, under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970,90 employers are prohibited from discharging em-
ployees who refuse to work under conditions which they reasonably
believe to be dangerous to their safety. 91
(unpublished decision of Administrative Law Judge Leonard N. Lawrence), a Con-
solidated Edison employee alleged that he was discharged because he complained
repeatedly about safety hazards at the utility's Indian Point 2 nuclear plant. After a
hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the Act protected employees
engaged in steps preliminary to filing a complaint with a governmental agency and
that the employee had been discharged for taking such steps. The ALJ recommended
that Consolidated Edison reinstate the employee to his former position or a "substan-
tially equivalent position as well as compensate him for back pay." See also Hudson,
Man Discharged By Con Ed Wins Backing of Judge, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1981, § B,
at 2, col. 6.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Supp. 111978). The Act provides that an employer may not
discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because the employee
commenced, caused to commence or testified at a proceeding against the employer
for violation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act. Reinstatement and
compensatory damages, including back pay, are available.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1976), provides that no employer may discharge or discrimi-
nate against an employee for instituting or testifying at a proceeding against the
employer for a violation of the Act. Reinstatement and compensatory damages may
be awarded.
89. 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1976), provides that a railroad company engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce may not discharge or discriminate against an em-
ployee because the employee has filed a complaint, instituted or caused to be insti-
tuted any proceedings under or related to the enforcement of the federal railroad
safety laws or has testified or is about to testify at such a proceeding. Additionally, 45
U.S.C. § 441(b) prohibits a discharge or discrimination against an employee for
refusing to work under hazardous conditions. Reinstatement and back pay may be
awarded.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976), prohibits employers from discharging or discrimi-
nating against employees who have filed a complaint or instituted a proceeding
against the employer for violations of the Act. Reinstatement and back pay may be
awarded.
91. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980). In Whirlpool two employees
of a household appliance manufacturer refused to perform their regular duties in a
factory, claiming that a wire-mesh screen installed to prevent objects from falling
from an overhead conveyor was unsafe. The employees were immediately removed
from their shift, without pay for the remainder of that shift, and received written
reprimands which were placed in their employment files. The employees' refusal
followed a series of accidents and several meetings with plant supervisors and repre-
sentatives of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
The Secretary of Labor brought suit, alleging that the employer's action consti-
tuted discrimination under § 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976). Specifically, the Secretary relied on 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12 (1979), which provides that under the Act, an employee has an implied right
to refuse to work under conditions which he reasonably believes to be hazardous to
his safety:
The condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circum-
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A number of other federal laws have been enacted to limit the right
of employers to discharge employees. For example, the Consumer
Credit Protection Act 92 prohibits employers from terminating em-
ployees because of garnishment of wages for any one indebtedness; the
Fair Labor Standards Act93 prohibits employers from discharging or
otherwise discriminating against employees for asserting their rights
under the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act; the
Vietnam Veterans Act of 197394 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of an individual's status as a veteran of the Vietnam War; and the
Selective Service Act 95 provides that veterans discharged from the
armed services can return to the jobs they held prior to such service.
In addition, various state laws prohibit employers from discharging or
taking other punitive action against employees to influence or control
their votes, political activities or opinions, 96 for refusing to take lie
detector tests97 or for serving as jurors. 98  Federal civil service em-
stances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real
danger of death or serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to
the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to
regular statutory enforcement channels. In addition, in such circum-
stances, the employee, where possible, must also have sought from his
employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condi-
tion.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1979).
The district court denied relief on the grounds that although the employee's refusal
to work was justified under 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12, the regulation was inconsistent
with the Act and therefore invalid. The court of appeals reversed and remanded,
concluding that the regulation was valid. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the validity of the regulation, finding it consistent with the Act's language and
objective of preventing job-related deaths and injuries. The Court emphasized,
however, that the regulation neither authorizes employees to order their employer to
correct the hazardous condition nor insulates them from discharge or reprimand in
the event a court subsequently finds that they acted unreasonably or in bad faith. 445
U.S. at 21.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1976).
94. 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976) (returning veterans cannot be discharged for one year
except for "cause"); see, e.g., Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
95. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(2)(A) (1976).
96. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108
(1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 56, § 33 (West 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040
(1973); Human Rights Law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 34-11.1 (Supp. IV 1977).
97. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g
(1977); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 100, § 95 (1957); MIcH. COMp. LAWS § 388.1726 (1970);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321(a) (Purdon 1973). See also Summers, supra note 1,
at 495 n.84.
98. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 2-218 (1979); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268, § 14A
(1980). See also Summers, supra note 1, at 495 n.83. Termination of an employee for
serving as a grand or petit juror in a federal court is prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1875
(Supp. III 1980).
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ployees and certain state and local public employees also are statuto-
rily protected from unfair discharges. 9
IV. Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Rule
Certain common law exceptions to the employment-at-will rule
have developed in recent years in a number of jurisdictions. Courts
have allowed employees to sue for wrongful dischargesl00 under con-
tract, tort and other theories of recovery.' 0 ' Contract recovery has
99. With respect to federal civil service employees, see Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513(a) (Supp. 111978) (discharge of federal civil employees
is permitted only "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service").
Federal civil service employees receive greater protection from discrimination and
unjust discharge than state and local government employees. See Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, -, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922 nn.10-11, modi-
fied, 117 Cal. App. 3d 520a (1981); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1979). With respect to state
and local public employees, see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (where a
public employee's "liberty" or property interests are at stake, he is entitled to due
process protections of notice and hearing). See generally J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (2d ed. 1973); Chaturverdi, Legal Protection Available to
Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 287 (1968);
Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124
U. PA. L. REV. 942 (1976).100. The term "wrongful discharge" is a generic term which includes all dis-
charges for other than "just cause." The term "abusive discharge" has been used
interchangeably by courts which have considered both contract and tort causes of
action. "Retaliatory discharge" has been used by courts to describe tort claims for
dismissals in retaliation for such employee actions as filing worker's compensation
claims and reporting illegal employer behavior. See notes 106-74 infra and accompa-
nying text.
101. Courts in the following jurisdictions have allowed an at-will employee to sue
an employer for a wrongful discharge on tort or contract theories-California:
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Illinois: Kelsay v. Motorala, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978);
Indiana: Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Maryland: Adler v. American Standard Corp., Misc. No. 12 (Md. Ct. App.,
July 16, 1981), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144, at D-1 (July 28, 1981);
Massachusetts: Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977); Michigan: Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976); New Hampshire: Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549
(1974); New Jersey: O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1978); Oregon: Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975);
Pennsylvania: Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(applying Pennsylvania law); West Virginia: Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont,
246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts in the following jurisdictions have recognized causes of action for wrongful
discharge based on other theories of recovery-Massachusetts: Agis v. Howard John-
son Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress); Minnesota: Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. 1981) (promissory estoppel); New York: McCullough v. Certain Teed Prod-
ucts Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1979) (prima facie tort).
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been granted where a discharge constitutes a breach of the "implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing," 102 whereas tort recovery has
been granted for discharges in violation of express public policy. 03 In
addition, courts have recognized causes of action for the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress, for prima facie tort, and based
on promissory estoppel. 10 4 Despite these developments, other juris-
dictions have continued to adhere to the rule that an employment-at-
will relationship may be terminated by either party with or without
cause at any time. 105
A. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:
Recovery in Contract
Perhaps the most drastic departure from the at-will rule found its
justification in the general principle that an obligation of "good faith
and fair dealing" is implied by law in every contract. 106 Until the
decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. 0 7 in 1974, the notion of good faith had not been viewed
as a limitation on an employer's freedom to discharge at-will em-
ployees. Other jurisdictions such as Massachusetts and California have
subsequently recognized the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
without explicitly adopting the rationale of Monge.108
1. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.
In Monge plaintiff-employee had been hired by the defendant for
an indefinite period of time as a conversion machine operator. Plain-
tiff shortly thereafter applied for a higher paying job on a press
machine whereupon she was told by her foreman that she would have
to be "nice" in order to get that job. Soon after plaintiff had been
awarded the higher paying job, the same foreman invited her out on a
date. Plaintiff declined to accept the foreman's invitation because she
was married and had three children. The press machine was subse-
102. See notes 106-41 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "good
faith and fair dealing" approach, see Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to
Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge, 6 EMp. REL. L.J. 422, 426-35 (Winter 1980-
81).
103. See notes 142-74 infra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 222-49 infra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 175-221 infra and accompanying text.
106. For the general principle that an obligation of "good faith and fair dealing" is
implied by law in all contracts, see 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 568, at 331 (1961); 5 S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961).
107. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
108. See notes 126-41 infra and accompanying text.
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quently shut down after being in operation for only three weeks and
plaintiff was demoted to a lower paying job. For months thereafter,
plaintiff alleged that she was harassed and ultimately fired because
she had refused to date her foreman. Plaintiff sued on the grounds
that she had been terminated as a result of this unjustifiable hostility
towards her by the defendant through its agents in breach of her
employment-at-will contract. 109
In affirming the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff with respect to the
contract claim for twenty weeks of lost wages, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite
term, the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit
must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintain-
ing his employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a
proper balance between the two .... We hold that a termination
by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is
motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in
the best interest of the economic system or the public good and
constitutes a breach of the employment contract .... Such a rule
affords the employee a certain stability of employment and does
not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of his right to
discharge, which is necessary to permit him to operate his business
efficiently and profitably." 0
The court relied on two prior cases, Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co."' and Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters,112 the former of which granted tort recovery for a retaliatory
discharge in violation of express public policy embodied in state
law.1 3 Nevertheless, it reversed the jury's award of tort damages for
mental suffering, holding that the cause of action sounded in contract
only and not in tort. 1 4 In contrast to Frampton and Petermann, the
public policy to which the Monge court addressed itself was a general
public interest-the "best interest of the economic system or the pub-
lic good. ... " "1 This inconsistency in the Monge decision has been
partially resolved in later cases which have limited its holding and
created exceptions under other theories of recovery.
109. Id. at 130-32, 316 A.2d at 550-51.
110. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted).
111. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
112. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
113. For a discussion of the public policy exception, see notes 142-74 infra and
accompanying text.
114. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
115. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
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2. Application of Monge
Although Monge has been cited by a number of other jurisdictions
in cases concerning the concept of wrongful or abusive discharges,""
the rationale is of questionable value to such cases. Unlike Monge, the
majority of jurisdictions which have applied the concept of abusive
discharge have relied on violations of articulated public policy in
finding that employees had valid causes of action for wrongful termi-
nations." 7 The few decisions explicitly following Monge, however,
have implied a right against "bad faith" discharges in so-called em-
ployment-at-will contracts to allow recovery for terminations in viola-
tion of that right."18  For example, in Pstragowski v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co.," 9 a federal court, applying New Hampshire law,
held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict
that the discharge of the plaintiff as a local sales manager was moti-
vated by malice on the part of the defendant and thus constituted a
breach of contract under New Hampshire law. The Pstragowski court
cited Monge for the broad proposition that "an employee who is
discharged by reason of the bad faith, malice, or retaliatory motives
of his employer has a right of action for breach of contract, notwith-
standing the fact that he was an employee at will." 120
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Ho-
ward v. Dorr Woolen Co.12 ' limited Monge by stating that that
decision only applies "to a situation where an employee is discharged
because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or
refused to do that which public policy would condemn."' 122  The
116. See cases cited in note 101 supra; see also DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144, at
A-7 (July 28, 1981).
117. See notes 142-74 infra and accompanying text.
118. For cases that have explicitly followed Monge, see Pstragowski v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64
F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974).
119. 553 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 2.
121. 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980).
122. Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. In Howard the court considered whether
decedent-employee had been discharged in violation of Monge based on his age, his
illness and for the purpose of denying him accrued retirement benefits. Concerning
the last allegation, the court held that the discharge of the decedent, who was 50
years old, was not for the purpose of denying him retirement benefits because such
benefits would not have accrued until the decedent had reached age 55. Id. Never-
theless, it should be noted that under the provisions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976), employers may not
discharge or otherwise discipline employees in order to prevent them from attaining
vested rights in pension plans covered by that Act. Id. § 1140; Calhoun v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (employee who alleged that his
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court held that a discharge based on sickness or because of age does
not fall within this "narrow category." 123 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court noted that discharges due to illness are "generally
remedied by medical insurance or disability provisions in an employ-
ment contract," while the "proper remedy" for discharges because of
age are found in applicable federal and state statutes.124 On the same
day that Howard was decided, the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire, in Tice v. Thomson, 25 refused to extend Monge to cover a
public employee employed by the state governor.
3. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.1 26 plaintiff, a sixty-one
year old salesman with forty years of service, alleged that he was
terminated so that the defendant-employer could avoid paying him
certain commissions otherwise due to him on a five million dollar sale.
Although plaintiff was employed by the defendant under a written
"salesman's contract," that contract specified that his employment
could be terminated at-will without cause by either party on written
notice. 27
Citing Monge, the Fortune court affirmed the jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff stating:
We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to
employment contracts the rule that "in every contract there is an
implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will
have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party
employer discharged him after nine years of satisfactory service in order to prevent
him from attaining vested rights stated a cause of action under ERISA, irrespective of
whether the employee's rights were vested at the time of his discharge).
123. 120 N.H. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. But see McKinney v. National Dairy
Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980), note 131 infra.
124. 120 N.H. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. Other jurisdictions have denied common
law recovery for discharges where statutory remedies existed. See notes 214-21 infra
and accompanying text.
125. 120 N.H. 313, 414 A.2d 1284 (1980). In Tice plaintiff was employed by
defendant-Governor of New Hampshire as Coordinator for Drug Abuse. During an
investigation of alleged misuse of federal funds provided to the state for drug abuse
prevention, the attorney general seized plaintiff's records at defendant's request.
After plaintiff filed suit against defendant alleging that the seizures were unconstitu-
tional, he was discharged by defendant and then commenced another suit for wrong-
ful discharge. Plaintiff had no employment contract, and was subject to removal by
the Governor without cause. In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's suit for wrongful
discharge, the court held that Monge, which involved a breach of a private contract,
did not apply to public employees such as plaintiff.
126. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
127. Id. at 97, 364 N.E.2d at 1253.
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to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.... 
1 2 18
Despite its reference to Monge, the Fortune court declined to pro-
nounce its adherence to such a "broad policy" or to speculate
"whether the good faith requirement is implicit in every contract for
employment at will."'' 29 The court merely held that the contract in
question contained "an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing" which the defendant had breached. 130 The rationale of Fortune
has been extended under Massachusetts law to cover discharges where
age is the determining factor' 3 ' and terminations which cause the
forfeiture of benefits almost accrued. 32
4. California Cases
California courts are willing to find an "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing" in employment-at-will contracts based on the
128. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (citations omitted), quoting Druker v. Roland
Wm. Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 385, 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976).
129. 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
130. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
131. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass.
1980), where the court, applying Massachusetts law, held that the Fortune rule
applies to discharges where age is the determining factor. In McKinney plaintiff-em-
ployee alleged that defendant indicated that his job would last until his normal
retirement date. Nineteen years after accepting the job, plaintiff was fired. The court
found that plaintiff's age was the reason for the termination. Although the court held
that the discharge was a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as enunciated in Fortune, it also held that the discharge, because of plaintiff's
age, violated a public policy against age discrimination in employment. For a discus-
sion of McKinney, see Comment, McKinney v. National Dairy Council: The Em-
ployee at Will Relationship in Massachusetts, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 285 (1980-81).
See also Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1357
(July 10, 1981), in which the court held that Fortune applied to a case concerning a
general manager of a bus company who was discharged to prevent his receipt of an
earned commission. Plaintiff's employment contract provided that in addition to his
weekly salary he would receive compensation based on revenue from Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) charter rights which he obtained for the company.
The court found that, like the employment agreement in Fortune, plaintiff's contract
contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which defendant
breached when it discharged him to frustrate his accrual of an earned benefit. The
court added that plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of receiving earned compen-
sation even though he knew that he could be discharged without cause at any time.
132. See Horrigan v. General Motors Corp., No. 77-3302-Z, slip. op. at 3 (D.
Mass., July 23, 1980) (where employee was discharged to prevent imminent accrual
of retirement benefits, the court held under Fortune that plaintiff stated a claim
upon which relief could be granted because "termination which causes 'forfeiture
... of benefits almost earned' equally constituted breach of contract ....").
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totality of the parties' relationship. In Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., ' 33 for example, an employee was summarily discharged for an
alleged theft after eighteen years of "satisfactory" employment. The
employee claimed that he was wrongfully terminated based on an
express company policy requiring a "fair, impartial and objective
hearing" in such cases, and on the "implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing."134 In holding that the employee had stated a
cause of action on both of these grounds, the court found two factors
to be of "paramount importance": the longevity of plaintiff's services
(eighteen years) and the expressed policy of the employer to adopt
specific procedures for adjudicating employee disputes. 35  The court
held "that the longevity of the employee's service, together with the
expressed policy of the employer, operate as a form of estoppel, pre-
cluding any discharge of such an employee by the employer without
good cause." 136
The rationale of Cleary was subsequently applied in Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc., 37 where an employee was allegedly discharged after
thirty-two years of service for his opposition to the negotiation of a
"sweetheart contract" with a union after he had been selected by the
company to be part of its negotiating team for such a contract. 13s
133. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
134. Id. at 447, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
135. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. In reaching its decision, the court
stated:
Two factors are of paramount importance in reaching our result .... One
is the longevity of service by plaintiff-18 years of apparently satisfactory
performance. Termination of employment without legal cause after such a
period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts....
The second factor of considerable significance is the expressed policy of
the employer . . .set forth in [the] regulation [referred to in the plead-
ings]. This policy involves the adoption of specific procedures for adjudi-
cating employee disputes such as this one. While the contents 'of the
regulation are not before us, its existence compels the conclusion that this
employer had recognized its responsibility to engage in good faith and fair




137. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, modified, 117 Cal. App. 3d 520a
(1981). California has codified the employment-at-will rule in CAL. LAB. CODE §
2922 (West 1971), which provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other .... Employment for
a specified term means no employment for a period greater than one month."
138. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 919-20. Plaintiff testified at trial
that his opposition was based on his concern that "if [the company and union] in fact
had a sweetheart contract that it wouldn't be fair to any female employees to be
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Relying in substantial part on Cleary, the Pugh court found that
plaintiff had stated a cause of action based on the "totality of the
parties' relationship ... "139 Pugh thus held that an implied cove-
nant of good faith could exist under the facts of the instant case based
on "the duration of [plaintiff's] employment, the commendations and
promotions he received, the apparent lack of any direct criticism of
his work, the assurances he was given, and the employer's acknowl-
edged policies."i 40 As such, the court held that plaintiff had "demon-
strated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of his
contract of employment."141
B. The Public Policy Exception: Recovery in Tort
A number of jurisdictions have recognized the concept of abusive
discharge as an exception to the employment-at-will rule in order to
allow recovery for wrongful terminations which violate an express
public policy. Most claims arising under the public policy exception
are founded on tort rather than on contractual theories of recov-
ery. 142  In order to recover damages in tort under the abusive dis-
charge concept, the burden has been placed on the aggrieved em-
ployee to prove that his employer violated the public policy of a
particular state in effectuating his discharge.14 3
Claims for wrongful discharge based on violations of clearly articu-
lated state interests were the first causes of action to be recognized
getting less money than someone would get working in the same industry under the
same manager." Id. at __, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
139. Id. at -' 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
140. Id. at __, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. The Pugh court also noted that the
California Supreme Court in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), had recognized that a cause of action could
exist based on the implied covenant of good faith but had not ruled on it. 116 Cal.
App. 3d at __, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
141. 116 Cal. App. 3d at -, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. Having found that the
employee had made out a prima facie case, the court held that the employer had the
burden of proving that it had "just cause" or "good cause" for the termination. The
court stated that "just cause" and "good cause" connote " 'a fair and honest cause or
reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party exercising the power,' " id.,
citing R.J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie, 218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 145, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1963), while noting that in construing those terms, "[c]are must be taken,. . . not to
interfere with the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion." 116 Cal. App. 3d at
-, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 926.
142. See cases cited in Adler v. American Standard Corp., Misc. No. 12 (Md. Ct.
App. July 16, 1981), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 144, at D-1, D-2 to
D-3 (July 28, 1981). In Monge although the court referred to general public policy,
recovery was found in contract on a "bad faith" theory rather than in tort on a public
policy theory. See notes 110-15 supra and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
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under the public policy exception. One of the leading decisions in
establishing this exception was the California case of Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.144 In that case, plaintiff-
employee was fired because he refused to commit perjury before a
legislative committee. The court held that plaintiff had stated a cause
of action for wrongful discharge, reasoning that "[lt would be obnox-
ious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and
sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee,
whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration,
on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjtury, an act
specifically enjoined by statute." 45  Accordingly, the court created
an exception to the employment-at-will rule in order to effectuate the
declared policy of the State of California against perjury. Petermann,
however, addressed itself only to claims for contract damages.
The Petermann rule was extended in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. 46 to encompass tort actions for damages arising out of abusive
discharges. In Tameny plaintiff-employee was allegedly terminated
for refusing to participate in an illegal gas price-fixing scheme. Plain-
tiff sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages based on
what the court considered to be three separate tort causes of action. 47
Citing cases from California 148 and other jurisdictions 149 which had
previously recognized the propriety of a tort remedy for discharges in
contravention of public policy, the Tameny court held that "a wrong-
ful discharge suit exhibits the classic elements of a tort cause of
action." 150  In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Peter-
mann, stating:
an employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee
who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any
express or implied " 'promises set forth in the [employment] con-
tract' "..., but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all
employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies
embodied in the state's penal statutes.'15
144. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
145. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
146. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
147. Id. at 174-75, 610 P.2d at 1333-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
148. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
149. Id. at 177, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 845, citing Nees v. Hocks, 272
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W. Va. 1978).
150. 27 Cal. 3d at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
151. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 844, quoting Eads v. Marks,
39 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952).
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Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the
matter remanded for further proceedings.
1. Retaliatory Discharges
Another leading decision in the development of the public policy
exception was the Indiana case of Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas
Co. which recognized a cause of action for what the court termed a
"retaliatory discharge."'' 5 2 In that case, plaintiff-employee was dis-
charged for filing a workmen's compensation claim under a state
statute. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in reversing the decision of
the appellate court, held "that an employee who alleges he or she was
retaliatorily discharged for filing a claim pursuant to the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act . . . or the Indiana Workmen's Occu-
pational Diseases Act ... has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted." 15 3
Other jurisdictions also have applied the public policy exception
where employees were discharged in retaliation for filing workmen's
compensation claims under applicable state law.1 , 4  In Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc.,'5 5 for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois, relying
in part on Frampton and the decision of a Michigan appellate court in
Sventko v. Kroger Co.,'N held that the defendant-employer's retalia-
tory discharge of plaintiff was "offensive to the public policy of [Illi-
nois] as stated in the Workmen's Compensation Act." 5 7 In reaching
its decision, the Kelsay court rejected the rationale of the Seventh
Circuit in Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 58 where a contrary conclu-
sion on similar facts was reached, on the grounds that the construction
of the Workmen's Compensation Act in that case contravened the
public policy of the State of Illinois. 5 9 The Kelsay court thus charac-
152. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
153. Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428 (citations omitted) ("We further hold that such
a discharge would constitute an intentional, wrongful act on the part of the employer
for which the injured employee is entitled to be fully compensated in damages.").
154. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978);
Sventko ,. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Shanholtz v. Monongahela
Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980).
155. 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); see Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. -
Illinois Courts Welcome Retaliatory Discharge Suits Under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839 (1980).
156. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
157. 74 Ill. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
158. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
159. 74 I11. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
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terized "retaliatory discharge" as a separate and independent tort for
which both compensatory and punitive damages could be awarded.
The concept of retaliatory discharge under the public policy excep-
tion has been applied in a number of jurisdictions under a variety of
circumstances. These include situations where an employee had been
fired-for serving on a jury against an employer's wishes, 160 for refus-
ing to take a lie detector test where the state in question had an
anti-polygraph statute,'"' for supplying information to the police
about the suspected wrongdoings of another employee,'6 2 for refusing
to participate in a price-fixing scheme, 6 3 for refusing to administer
improper medical treatment in violation of state law,16 4 and for at-
tempting to have an employer comply with state and federal con-
sumer credit protection laws.' 6 5
2. Recent Cases
Recent cases demonstrate a limited trend toward recognizing the
public policy exception, especially where the policy involved is ex-
press. For example, in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 86 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in adopting this exception, concluded
160. Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
161. Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law).
162. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., Index No. 53780 (Ill. Sup. Ct.
April 17, 1981). The court in Palmateer held that the discharge would be a violation
of public policy even in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provisions,
because "the foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of
public policy" and "public policy ... favors citizen crime-fighters." The Palmateer
court construed public policy broadly to include interests that are not explicitly
protected by federal or state law. This general public policy approach is similar to
that articulated in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974),
notes 109-15 supra and accompanying text, but appears to have been rejected by the
majority of jurisdictions which have considered the public policy exception in favor
of an express public policy. See notes 183-213 infra and accompanying text.
163. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
164. O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1978).
165. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). See
also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods Inc., 179 Conn, 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980)
(Employee was discharged because he told employer that his products deviated from
the standards promulgated by Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.
The court held that if the allegations were proved, employer could be liable for tort
damages because its conduct clearly violated a statutory public policy.).
166. Misc. No. 12 (Md. Ct. App., July 16, 1981), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 144, at D-1 (July 28, 1981).
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that the employment-at-will rule should be modified in situations
where "the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear man-
date of public policy...."167 Nevertheless, the court held that the
allegations of plaintiff-employee were "too general, too conclusory,
too vague, and lacking in specifics," to justify an abusive discharge
claim against the defendant-employer. 68  Although plaintiff alleged
that he was wrongfully discharged in order to prevent him from
revealing certain improprieties and illegal activities at the com-
pany, 9 the court found that he had failed to prove a specific violation
of federal or state law.
Similarly, it has been suggested that New York also may be willing
to adopt the public exception under "propitious" circumstances. In
Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc. 170 a federal court stated, "[w]hile no case
in New York has yet recognized the tort of abusive discharge, prece-
dent does suggest New York courts will do so when presented with the
proper case.' 171 In support of its contention, the Savodnick court
cited the New York case of Chin v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,172 which recognized that a new cause of action based on the
doctrine of abusive discharge could exist if a plaintiff-employee estab-
lished that a public policy of the state had been violated by the
defendant-employer.I7 3 Because the plaintiff in Savodnick had alleg-
edly been discharged after thirteen years of service in order to deprive
him of his pension rights which were to vest after fifteen years, the
court concluded that in light of the strong public policy in New York
favoring the integrity of pension plans "if ever there was a case to
invoke the doctrine of abusive discharge, this is it."'' 74
V. Adherence to the At-Will Rule
The majority of jurisdictions have continued to resist the limited
trend toward creating exceptions to the employment-at-will rule. The
167. Id., slip op. at D-5.
168. Id., slip op. at D-4.
169. Id., slip op. at D-1. These illegal activities included, "the payment of com-
mercial bribes and falsification of corporate records and financial statistics."
170. 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
171. Id. at 826. Accord, Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (claim of abusive discharge based on age discrimination could be "cognizable"
under New York law); but see Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d
1005 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980) (New York does not presently recognize tort of
abusive discharge).
172. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aJJ'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (lst Dep't 1979). For a further discussion of Chin, see
notes 255-57 infra and accompanying text.
173. 96 Misc. 2d at 1075, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
174. 488 F. Supp. at 826.
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"bad faith" termination exception recognized in Monge v. Beebe Rub-
ber Co.'7 5 has been directly rejected by a number of courts, while
others have declined to apply the rationale of that case to the facts
before them.1 76 The concept of retaliatory discharge in violation of
public policy has met a similar fate. Even in jurisdictions which have
recognized the public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule, recent decisions in these jurisdictions demonstrate a trend
toward limiting such an exception to discharges which violate a clear
statutory mandate or express public policy.' 77
A. Rejection of Monge
Courts have either avoided or rejected the attempts of discharged
employees to utilize the rationale of Monge in order to establish a
wrongful termination in violation of the "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing."' 78 For example, in Catania v. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc.,' 79 a Florida appellate court declined to find either a "bad
faith" discharge or public policy violation in discharges allegedly due
to the plaintiffs' criticism of the defendant's employment policies. The
court avoided applying either exception to the at-will rule by refusing
to follow cases such as Monge, Fortune and Petermann.'80
Other courts have explicity rejected Monge. In Larsen v. Motor
Supply Co.,181 plaintiff-employees attempted to utilize the Monge rule
to argue that they were terminated in "bad faith" for refusing to sign a
"'psychological stress evaluation test" consent form which contained
certain misleading statements. 182  In rejecting plaintiffs' claim, the
Arizona appellate court declared that Monge was not the law of that
state and that, in any event, plaintiffs' failure to submit to a new
company policy was not sufficient to show "bad faith" on the part of
the defendant.' 83 The court thus declined "to circumscribe an em-
ployer's right to terminate an employee for his refusal to follow com-
pany policy." 184
175. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); for a discussion of Monge, see notes
109-15 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 178-84 infra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 185-213 infra and Accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App.
1977); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
179. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
180. Id. at 267. The court rejected "plaintiff's invitation to be a 'law giver.' " Id.
181. 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977).
182. Id. at 508, 573 P.2d at 908.
183. Id. at 509, 573 P.2d at 909.
184. Id.
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B. Limitations on the Public Policy Exception
It is becoming increasingly clear that courts will not create a public
policy in order to sustain claims for abusive discharge. In fact, certain
courts have dismissed such claims where no evidence was proffered to
establish that an applicable statute specifically prohibited the type of
discharge in question. Other courts have not inferred such a prohibi-
tion even when confronted with statutes clearly designed to promote a
public interest. Moreover, the abusive discharge concept has been
rejected where other statutory remedies are available to discharged
employees.
In the absence of a clear mandate of public policy, courts appear to
be unwilling to sustain claims of abusive discharge. 185 In Abrisz v.
Pulley Freight Lines, Inc. ,186 for example, the court held that a plain-
tiff-employee did not establish that her discharge was in violation of
public policy where she alleged that she was terminated for aiding a
fellow employee's unemployment benefit claim by making false state-
ments. Other courts have declined to recognize a public policy where
an employee was discharged for announcing his intention to attend
law school at night; 187 for seeking to work on the same shift with
another employee where the two employees were living together at
the time and the company had a rule against relatives working on the
same shift; 88 for reporting the alleged misconduct of superiors; 189 for
questioning the safety of an employer's products; 90 for filing for
bankruptcy; '91 and for refusing to get a haircut as required by com-
pany policy.192
Courts have refused to read into broad statements of statutory
policy a cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge. 93 In
185. See, e.g., Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978);
Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95
Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
186. 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
187. Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977). The court appar-
ently rejected Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977), see notes 126-132 supra and accompanying text, in denying recovery for a
violation of a private interest, namely higher education.
188. Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
189. Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Martin
v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
190. Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., - Pa. Super. Ct. -. , 422 A.2d 611 (1980);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
191. West v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 145 Ga. App. 808, 245 S.E.2d 46 (1978).
192. Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 50
A.D.2d 83, 376 N.Y.S.2d 32 (3d Dep't 1975), afJ'd, 39 N.Y.2d 877, 352 N.E.2d 140,
386 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1976).
193. See, e.g., Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d
513 (1978); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
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Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center194 no cause of action was held
to exist on behalf of a nurse who alleged that she had been discharged
for failing to comply with her employer's order to reduce her staff in
the intensive care ward of a hospital. 95  The nurse disobeyed the
directive of her employer, because she believed that such a reduction
would have jeopardized patient care in that ward. In support of her
claim, the nurse relied on general policy statements contained in state
statutes creating and authorizing a State Board of Nursing to disci-
pline a nurse who " 'has negligently or willfully acted in a manner
inconsistent with the health or safety of persons under her
care.... . ,,196 The Colorado appellate court, in affirming the dis-
missal of plaintiff's claim, held that the broad policy statements con-
tained in these statutes did not alter the at-will relationship between
the nurse and her employer based on the mere possibility of discipli-
nary action under the statutes in question.19 7
Similarly, in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,'9 8 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a doctor who was discharged for
refusing to perform research on a controversial drug had no cause of
action because there was no specific expression of public policy pro-
hibiting such research. Although the doctor alleged that the Hippo-
cratic Oath prevented her from continuing the research, the court
found no clear mandate in the Oath preventing the doctor from
performing her assignment. As a result of its decision in Pierce, the
New Jersey Supreme Court limited a prior ruling in O'Sullivan v.
Mallon.99 That decision had upheld a breach of contract claim by an
x-ray technician discharged for refusing to perform catheterizations,
which only doctors and nurses were authorized to administer under
state law. The court in Pierce thus restricted O'Sullivan to cases
concerning a "clear mandate of public policy. ' 20 0
The public policy exception has been similarly limited in other
jurisdictions. In Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital20 1 an Illinois appellate
court held that the public policy exception recognized in Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc. 20 2 for discharges in retaliation for the filing of work-
194. 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
195. Id. at 466, 590 P.2d at 514.
196. Id. at 467, 590 P.2d at 515, quoting COL. REV. STAT. § 12-38-217 (1973).
197. 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978).
198. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
199. 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
200. 84 N.J. at 67, 417 A.2d at 514. It should be noted that in O'Sullivan state law
authorized only doctors and nurses to perform catheterizations.
201. 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50 (1980).
202. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); see notes 155-59 supra for a discussion
of Kelsay.
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men's compensation claims was limited to the facts of that case. The
Rozier court found that plaintiff-employee, who was discharged for
leaking alleged incidences of patient abuse and other improprieties at
a hospital to newspapers, had not stated a claim for retaliatory dis-
charge even if Kelsay were extended beyond its facts.20 3
Courts also have refused to infer a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge from statutes promoting a public interest. In Bender Ship
Repair, Inc. v. Stevens 20 4 the Supreme Court of Alabama held that an
employee fired for serving on a grand jury did not have a cause of
action for abusive discharge under a state law which only protected
employees from the loss of compensation for such service. In Dockery
v. Lampart Table Co. 205 a North Carolina appellate court similarly
rejected a claim for wrongful termination where an employee was
discharged for filing a workmen's compensation claim, reasoning that
the public policy questions raised by such a discharge were for the
state legislature to decide.20 6
Because Bender and Dockery considered statutes which were virtu-
ally identical to those held to evince an express public policy in other
jurisdictions, their holdings to the contrary represent an outright re-
fusal to read public policy into state legislation. 20 7 Federal courts also
may be unwilling to predict whether state courts will apply the public
policy exception. The recent case of Phillips v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. 208 demonstrates this point. In that case, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that an employee who was dis-
charged for testifying truthfully at court proceedings had not been
wrongfully discharged under either the laws of Georgia or Texas.
Noting that the at-will rule had been codified in Georgia 20 and
recognized by the common law of Texas, 210 the Fifth Circuit stated:
203. 88 Ill. App. 3d at 999, 411 N.E.2d at 54.
204. 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980).
205. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978).
206. Id. at 299, 244 S.E.2d at 276 ("Remedies for claims resulting from alleged
violations of the spirit of the act are best left to the legislature.").
207. Bender in effect rejects Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), in
which an Oregon court held that a discharge for jury service was in violation of
public policy expressed in a state law requiring such service. Similarly, Dockery
rejects cases such as Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973), and Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978),
which held that discharges for filing workers compensation claims violated the public
policy expressed, respectively, in Indiana and Illinois statutes.
208. Civ. No. 79-2011 (5th Cir., July 27, 1981).
209. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1979).
210. See, e.g., Bowen v. Wohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1975); St.
Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914).
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While the "public policy" exception may well be "wise and pro-
gressive social policy," recognition of our rule as a federal court
sitting in diversity precludes us from creating a "public policy"
exception to the at will rule in the absence of any indication that
the courts of Georgia or Texas might recognize such an excep-
tion.21 '
The Fifth Circuit did indicate, however, that it was "mindful of the
strong public policy in favor of protecting those who fulfill their duty
to testify truthfully in court proceedings.12 12  Nevertheless, it de-
clined to "predict" that the Supreme Courts of Georgia and Texas
would apply the public policy exception to the facts of the case,
particularly in light of the equally important consideration of preserv-
ing the at-will rule itself. 213
C. Existence of Other Remedies
The existence of other remedies has enabled jurisdictions to avoid
applying the public policy exception even where the jurisdiction rec-
ognizes its existence. For instance, in Paret v. Eaton Corp.214 a federal
district court, applying Michigan law, held that the alleged discharge
of an employee based on his national origin did not warrant an
exception to the employment-at-will rule, because the employee in
question had available to him adequate remedies under both federal
and state civil rights law. In reaching this holding, the Paret court
noted that its decision in Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.21 5 had
"declined to extend the public policy exceptions to instances where
Michigan law provided other full and adequate remedies. ' 216 Simi-
larly, in Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc. ,217 the Sixth Circuit held that indi-
viduals handicapped within the meaning of the Vocational Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973218 are limited to the administrative remedies
provided for by that statute and may not commence a private cause of
action for wrongful discharge. And in McCluney v. los. Schlitz Brew-
ing Co., 2 1 9 it was held that the remedies available under the Wiscon-
211. Civ. No. 79-2011, slip op. at 9623.
212. Id. slip op. at 9622.
213. Id. slip op. at 9621-23.
214. 479 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
215. 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977), modified, 456 F. Supp. 650 (E.D.
Mich. 1978).
216. 479 F. Supp. at 518.
217. 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
219. 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
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sin Employment Peace Act and the Fair Employment Act 220 pre-
cluded recovery for wrongful discharge at common law. Thus, these
cases represent a rejection of case law in other jurisdictions which
have allowed common law recovery notwithstanding the existence of
statutory remedies.221
VI. Other Theories of Recovery
Courts have been confronted with other theories of recovery in
determining whether discharged employees are entitled to be re-
dressed for damages allegedly sustained as a result of a "wrongful"
termination. These theories include recovery in tort for the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress, recovery for prima facie tort,
and recovery based on promissory estoppel. Certain courts have rec-
ognized employee claims for defamation 222 and false imprisonment 223
as well.
A. Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
Employees may be allowed to recover damages for the intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress where their termination of em-
ployment was effectuated by the "outrageous" conduct of an em-
ployer. The underlying basis for this cause of action is found in
Section 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts, entitled "Outrageous
220. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.01 -111.19 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981-82) ("The
Employment Peace Act"); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31 -111.64 (West 1974 & Supp.
1981-82) ("The Fair Employment Act").
221. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass.
1980), note 131 supra; Savodnick v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), notes 170-74 supra and accompanying text.
222. If actual malice is found, an employer loses its qualified privilege to publish
defamatory material about an employee. See, e.g., Pirre v. Printing Dev., Inc., 468
F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979) (actual malice found
where employee sued employer for defamatory statements about employee's work
performance even though such statements were communicated only to a few people
in the defendant's corporation); Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 85 Mich. App. 482, 271
N.W.2d 284 (1978) (employer's qualified privilege to publish defamatory material
about employee does not extend to communications circulated to other employees
who have no interest in the matter; only those who are concerned with an employee's
performance should be privy to such a communication).
223. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27 Md. App. 95, 340 A.2d 767
(1975), rev'd & remanded in part, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976), af'd after
remand, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977) (employee recovered for slander, false
imprisonment and assault where employer's security guards shoved him into an office
and detained him for a period of time on suspicion of stealing); Black v. Kroger Co.,
527 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (employee successfully sued for false imprison-
ment when employer unreasonably detained employee for questioning of alleged
thefts).
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Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress, ' 2 4 which states in perti-
nent part:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.2 25
Based on Section 46 of the Restsatement, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co. 226 recognized a
cause of action for the infliction of severe emotional distress on behalf
of a waitress who was the first employee to be discharged as part of a
plan to fire waitresses in alphabetical order until the persons responsi-
ble for certain thefts were discovered. In reaching this decision, how-
ever, the court held that before plaintiff could recover under such a
theory, she had to establish the presence of four factors.2 27  With
respect to plaintiff's complaint, the court found that it alleged suffi-
cient facts to show that the employer's " 'conduct was extreme and
outrageous, having a severe and traumatic effect upon plaintiff's emo-
tional tranquility.' "228 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
dismissing the complaint was reversed. 229
Subsequently, in Richey v. American Automobile Association,
Inc.,230 the same court held that a probationary employee had failed
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
225. Id.
226. 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
227. Id. at 144-45, 355 N.E.2d at 318-19. The following four factors were deline-
ated by the court:
(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or
should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
conduct, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment i (1965);...
(2) that the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," was "beyond all
possible bounds of decency" and was "utterly intolerable in a civilized
community," Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d (1965);...
(3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's
distress... ; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff
was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment j (1965). ...
Id. (citations omitted).
228. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319, quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d
493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970). The Agis court also held
that plaintiff's husband had a cause of action for loss of consortium arising out of her
severe emotional distress caused by the defendant's intentional or reckless conduct.
371 Mass. at 146, 355 N.E.2d at 319-20.
229. 371 Mass. at 147, 355 N.E.2d at 320.
230. - Mass. -, 406 N.E.2d 675 (1980).
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to allege a sufficient case of "outrage" where his discharge was based
on a supervisor's determination that he was not a "good risk for long
term employment" because of continued absences without notice and
his inability to withstand the pressures of the job.23' The Richey
court also stated in dicta that the rationale of Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co. 232 would not even be "remotely applicable in the
circumstances of the discharge of this probationary employee. ' 233
Other courts also have strictly construed the requirement of "out-
rage" for a cause of action based on the intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress. In Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,234 for exam-
ple, a federal district court, applying Michigan law, held that such a
cause of action will not lie without a finding that the conduct sur-
rounding the discharge was so outrageous" 'as to go beyond all possi-
ble bounds of decency.' ,235 The court held that plaintiff's discharge
for failing to respond to the directives of a security guard did not even
suffice to make a minimal showing of emotional distress.2 3
B. Prima Facie Tort
A prima facie tort ("disinterested malevolence") has been defined as
"the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damage, without
excuse or justification, by an act or a series of acts which would
otherwise be lawful." 237 A cause of action in prima facie tort must be
pleaded as an alternative theory of recovery and must include the
element of special damages.2 38 Until recently, most courts had de-
clined to hold that a wrongful discharge constituted a prima facie
tort.239
231. Id. at 677; see Annot., 86 A.L.R.3d 454 (1978).
232. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); for a discussion of Fortune, see notes
126-32 supra and accompanying text.
233. - Mass. at -, 406 N.E.2d at 678.
234. 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
235. Id. at 347, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d
(1965).
236. Id., quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment j (1965). The
court emphasized the language of Comment j to § 46 of the Restatement which
provides, in pertinent part, that the law" 'intervenes only where the distress inflicted
is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' " For a further
discussion of Novosel, see notes 267-69 infra and accompanying text.
237. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 A.D. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't 1955),
quoted with approval in ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368
N.E.2d 1230, 1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1977).
238. ATI, Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 368 N.E.2d 1230, 398
N.Y.S.2d 864 (1977); Nichols v. Item Publishers, 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860
(1956).
239. See, e.g., Perdue v. J.C. Penney Co., 470 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(under Texas law, wrongful discharge is not a prima facie tort); Keating v. BBDO
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Recent cases in New York suggest that a cause of action in prima
facie tort arising out of an alleged wrongful discharge of an employee
will at least survive a motion to dismiss. In McCullough v. Certain
Teed Products Corp.2 40 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
held that a complaint alleging that plaintiff was wrongfully dis-
charged for refusing to participate in allegedly unlawful conduct with
certain fellow employees and superiors was sufficient to state a cause
of action in prima facie tort. Similarly, in Balancio v. American
Optical Corp., 4' the court held that the elements of prima facie tort
were present where an employee alleged he was discharged suddenly
after several years of faithful and exemplary service because he asked
too many questions about a company "Regional Sales Manager Incen-
tive Compensation Plan." The court noted that plaintiff's significant
loss of wages and benefits was imposed as a punishment for asking
questions his superiors did not want to answer and denied the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment. 242
In Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,2 43 however, a
case cause of action in prima facie tort was dismissed by a federal
court, applying New York law, where a terminated employee alleged
only that the defendant had "maliciously and unjustifiably refused,
subsequent to his termination, to accept business from him on the
same terms as it does from other non-Phoenix agents. ' 244 The court
found that his general estimate of $250,000 in losses was not sufficient
to satisfy the pleading requirement for special damages and noted that
the defendant was under no duty to deal with plaintiff under New
York law. 245
Int'l Inc., 438 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (for a prima facie tort, employee must
allege and prove employer's specific intention to harm him); Kushner v. Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 76 A.D.2d 950, 428 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't 1980) (employer's right to
discharge employee-at-will does not give rise to prima facie tort); Wolpert v. First
Nat'l Bank of East Islip, 60 A.D.2d 577, 400 N.Y.S.2d 10 (2d Dep't 1977), afj'd, 46
N.Y.2d 798 (1978) (no cause of action in prima Jacie tort for wrongful discharge);
Cartwright v. Golub Corp., 51 A.D.2d 407, 381 N.Y.S.2d 901 (3d Dep't 1976) (no
prima facie tort damages arising from wrongful discharge); Chin v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979) (discharge of employee in connection
with employee's arrest at a political rally was not a prima facie tort).
240. 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (4th Dep't 1979).
241. Index No. 13229/80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester County, May 21, 1981).
242. Id., slip op. at 8-9.
243. Civ. No. 79-4488 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 3, 1980).
244. Id., slip op. at 7.
245. Id., slip op. at 9. The court cited Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 A.D.
443, 106 N.Y.S. 115 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 195 N.Y. 565, 88 N.E. 289 (1909), for the
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C. Promissory Estoppel
The principle of promissory estoppel may provide a basis for recov-
ery for wrongful terminations of employment-at-will relationships.
Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts defines promissory
estoppel as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 246
Nevertheless, courts have applied promissory estoppel to wrongful
discharge cases sparingly. 247
In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.248 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota found an employer liable on a theory of promissory estop-
pel. Plaintiff-employee had left his former position in reliance on
defendant's promise of employment and sought damages when it was
subsequently revoked. Under these circumstances, the court held that
plaintiff "had a right to assume he would be given a good faith
opportunity to perform his duties to the satisfaction of [defendant]
once he was on the job."2 49 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however,
refused to extend its decision to all employment-at-will relationships.
VII. The Effect of Personnel Policy Manuals on the
Ability to Discharge Employees-At-Will
Consistent with the limited trend toward creating exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule, courts recently have held that provisions in
personnel policy manuals which imply a right to continued employ-
ment, absent "just cause" for termination, may become part of the
employment contract, thereby limiting an employer's right to dis-
principle under well settled law in New York that all persons have an inherent right
to refuse to maintain trade relations with any individual for any reason or for no
reason at all. With respect to the issue of special damages, the court stated that the
pleading of such damages "requires a 'particularized statement of the reasonably
identifiable and reasonable losses suffered.' " Civ. No. 79-4488, slip op. at 9, quoting
Skouras v. Brut Prod., Inc., 45 A.D.2d 646, 648, 360 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1st Dep't
1974).
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
247. See generally Fuchs, Promissory Estoppel and Employment Agreements, 49
N.Y.S. B. J. 386 (1977).
248. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
249. Id. at 116 ("[Plaintiff] was not only denied that opportunity but resigned the




charge its employees summarily. Nevertheless, most courts still do not
regard personnel policy manuals as employment contracts for definite
terms of employment where such documents are merely unilateral
expressions of company policy. 250 Moreover, employers may be able
to ensure their ability to discharge at-will by explicitly providing in a
written agreement that an employee relationship is terminable at any
time without notice or cause.
A. Contractual Nature of Personnel Policy Manuals
Absent a showing of mutuality of obligation, personnel policy man-
uals are not generally regarded as employment contracts setting forth
the exclusive terms and conditions of employment. 21  The rationale
for this principle was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of
Kansas in Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co. 252 The court held
that a personnel policy manual does not create an employment con-
tract where:
the manual was not published until long after plaintiff's employ-
ment. It was only a unilateral expression of company policy and
procedures. Its terms were not bargained for by the parties and any
benefits conferred by it were mere gratuities. Certainly, no meet-
ing of the minds was evidenced by the defendant's unilateral act of
publishing company policy.
253
Relying on the principles set forth in Johnson, other courts also have
held that mere statements of company policy do not create contracts
for definite employment which may be terminated only for cause. 254
250. For a related discussion on permanent employment contracts and contracts
for definite term, see notes 40-67 supra and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775, 779
(1975); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 55, 551 P.2d 779, 782
(1976); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aJf'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st
Dep't 1979).
252. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976). In Johnson plaintiff was employed by
defendant as a "beef lugger" for over a year when he injured his shoulder. After
receiving workmen's compensation benefits, plaintiff returned to work but was no
longer able to lug beef. As a result of his inability to perform his duties, plaintiff was
discharged. He then brought suit alleging that defendant's "company policy man-
nual" which was distributed to employees during plaintiff's employment constituted
an employment contract. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that provisions in the manual
gave rise to a "just cause" requirement and an employment for life or until an
employee reached retirement age.
253. Id. at 55, 551 P.2d at 782.
254. See, e.g., Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., Civ. No. 80-A-1002 (D. Colo., Feb.
5, 1981); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), afJ'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't
1979).
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One of the leading decisions to recognize that personnel policy
manuals do not per se create employment contracts limiting the right
of employers to discharge at-will is the New York case of Chin v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 255  In Chin plaintiff-em-
ployee, who was discharged after he was arrested and charged with
driving a van into police during a political demonstration, claimed
that his employer's "code of conduct" manual created the only
grounds upon which his employment could be terminated. Citing
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co.,256 the Supreme Court, New
York County, dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract claim, because
the manual did not "describe or define the duties and responsibilities
of the particular position, the length of employment or the terms of
compensation-all essential elements in an employment agree-
ment. ' 257 Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff's employment
was terminable at-will.
A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court, New York
County, in Edwards v. Citibank, N.A. ,258 where plaintiff-employee
alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for having discovered
evidence of unlawful foreign currency manipulation. Plaintiff
claimed that he could be discharged only for cause based on various
company staff handbooks and manuals or other literature containing
employment policy guidelines.259 In dismissing plaintiff's breach of
contract claim, the court held that there was no mutuality of obliga-
tion and, as an employment for an indefinite duration, it was termi-
nable at-will. Relying on Chin, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim
that the various documents in question constituted an employment
contract because it found that "these documents [were] no more than
broad internal policy guidelines which cannot be held to embody the
exclusive procedures for termination."2 1
B. "Just Cause" Requirements in Personnel Policy Manuals
Although personnel policy manuals generally have not been con-
strued as creating employment contracts containing the exclusive
grounds for termination, an employer's right to discharge at-will may
255. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979).
256. 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
257. 96 Misc. 2d at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
258. 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aJf'd, 74
A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875 (1980).
259. It should be noted that in Edwards plaintiff did not allege that the discharge
violated any public policy.
260. 100 Misc. 2d at 60, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
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be limited where a policy contains a "just cause" standard but does
not otherwise constitute an agreement for a definite term .2'1 Whether
such a standard gives rise to an enforceable contract right has been
determined according to the facts and circumstances of the parties'
employment relationship .262 Where employees have signed written
disclaimers indicating that their employment is at-will, a "just cause"
provision may not be recognized as a contractual right.
Recent cases arising under Michigan law concerning an employer's
obligations under a personnel policy manual demonstrate these princi-
ples. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan26 3 the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that (1) a company personnel policy
providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is
legally enforceable even though the employment is for an indefinite
period of time; (2) such a provision may become part of the employ-
ment contract either by express written or oral agreement or as a
result of the employee's "legitimate expectations" under the em-
ployer's policy statements; and (3) statements in a hiring interview
that the employee would be retained "as long as he did his job" or
"was doing the job" are sufficient evidence of an express agreement
not to discharge except for good cause. 26 4  The court stated that
261. Although a personnel policy manual may give rise to a requirement of "just
cause" termination, it has not been held to give rise to a contract for permanent or
definite employment. See notes 252-60 supra and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Wernham v. Moore, 77 A.D.2d 262, 432 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't
1980) (court denied motion to dismiss complaint for wrongful discharge where
employee alleged that a Mission Society manual gave rise to a bilateral agreement to
discharge only for cause and that the complaint did not clearly and specifically allege
that the manual represented a bilateral agreement); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, -
A.D.2d -, 442 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep't 1981) (court held that a personnel manual
provision that employer could discharge an employee for "just and sufficient cause
only" gave rise to a cause of action for breach of contract where the employee and a
representative of the employer signed a statement declaring that his employment was
subject to the provisions of the manual).
263. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). This case consolidates two appeals.
In the first action, plaintiff-Toussaint was employed by Blue Cross for five years and
thereafter was discharged without cause. In the second action, plaintiff-Ebling was
similarly discharged without cause after two years of employment with Mesco Cor-
poration. In both cases, plaintiffs were given company assurances that they would
not be discharged as long as they did their job. In Toussaint's case, he also was given
a Blue Cross personnel policy manual which reinforced the oral assurances and
specified that it was company policy to discharge "for just cause only." Id. at 597,
292 N.W.2d at 884.
264. In referring to the employment-at-will rule, the Toussaint court stated that
the rule "is not a substantive limitation on the enforceability of employment con-
tracts but merely a rule of 'construction.' " Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884. Concern-
ing an employee's acceptance of employment for an indefinite term, the court added:
"We see no reason why an employment contract which does not have a definite
term-the term is 'indefinite'-cannot legally provide job security." Id. at 610, 292
N.W.2d at 890.
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established personnel policies and procedures can give rise to a right to
continued employment, which can be enforced contractually absent
cause for termination, "just as are rights so derived to bonuses, pen-
sions and other forms of compensation as previously held by Michigan
courts. ' 265  It did note, however, that an exception to its holding
could exist where an employer who has not agreed to job security
protects "itself by entering into a written contract which explicitly
provides that the employee serves at the pleasure or at the will of the
employer or as long as his services are satisfactory to the employer. 2 6
Relying on the exception set forth in Toussaint, a federal court in
Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 26 7 held that under Michigan law a
discharged employee did not have a right to a "just cause" determina-
tion prior to his severance where the employment application signed
by the employee stated that he could "be terminated, with or without
cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either
the company or [the employee].."2 6  Based on this statement, the
court reasoned that there was "no way that the plaintiff could reason-
ably have had a legitimate expectation of a right to a just cause
determination prior to termination.- 269  Accordingly, the court dis-
missed the cause of action based on wrongful discharge.
It has been since recognized, however, that a disclaimer will not
automatically absolve an employer from liability for representations
of company policy. In Schipani v. Ford Motor Co. 270 the Michigan
265. Id. at 618-19, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
266. Id. at 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
267. 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
268. Id. at 346.
The application stated in full:
I certify that the information contained in this application is correct to the
best of my knowledge and understand that falsification of this information
is grounds for dismissal in accordance with Sears, Roebuck and Co. policy.
I authorize the references listed above to give you any and all information
concerning my previous employment and any pertinent information they
may have, personal or otherwise, and release all parties from all liability
for any damage that may result from furnishing same to you. In consider-
ation of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of
Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be
terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no
store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the
president or vice-president of the Company has any authority to enter into
any agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or to
make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
269. Id.
270. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
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Court of Appeals recognized that written or oral assurances of contin-
ued employment may negate the effect of a disclaimer for a "just
cause" discharge and thereby limited the exception noted in Tous-
saint. Plaintiff in Schipani had signed a written employment contract
which stated:
I understand that my employment is not for any definite time, and
may be terminated at any time, without advance notice by either
myself or Ford Motor Company. 27'
Nevertheless, the employee claimed that he had a cause of action for
breach of contract based on certain written and oral company assur-
ances which he alleged constituted an implied contract to employ him
until he reached age sixty-five.
In affirming the lower court denial of summary judgment for the
defendant, the court held that whether the written contract was not
terminable at-will because of the company's written and oral assur-
ances was a question for the trier of fact. While the court acknowl-
edged that the oral contract might have been unenforceable under the
statute of frauds, it concluded that the principle of promissory estop-
pel could negate that defense. Moreover, because the employee al-
leged that he had surrendered his union membership to take a man-
agement position prior to his discharge, the court reasoned that this
was another factor for the trier of fact to consider in determining
whether the enforcement of the company's written and oral assur-
ances would be required to avoid injustice.272 With respect to the
disclaimer signed by plaintiff, the Schipani court stated that the deci-
sion of the Michigan Supreme Court in Kari v. General Motors
Corp.73 may indicate that "under appropriate circumstances, oral
271. Id. at 610, 302 N.W.2d at 309.
272. Id. at 615, 302 N.W.2d at 312.
273. 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d 925 (1978), rev'g 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d
222 (1977). In Kari the provisions of the employer's personnel policy handbook
relating to severance pay contained the following disclaimer: "The inclusion of a
schedule of separation allowances in this booklet, together with the conditions gov-
erning their payment, . . . is not intended nor is it to be interpreted to establish a
contractual relationship with the employe [sic]." 79 Mich. App. at 95, 261 N.W.2d at
223 (emphasis added). In addition to this statement, the handbook in question also
contained the following general disclaimer on the last page of that book printed in
italics and outlined in red:
The contents of this handbook are presented as a matter of information
only. While General Motors believes wholeheartedly in the plans, policies
and procedures described here, they are not conditions of employment.
General Motors reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend, terminate,
or change any or all such plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in
1981]
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promises may negate the effect of disclaimers which are intended to
absolve employers from liability for policies presented in handbooks or
other employer literature." 274
VIII. Personnel Policy Benefits and the
Employment-At-Will Rule
The discharge of at-will employees in order to cause the forfeiture
of accrued or almost accrued benefits has provided the basis in certain
jurisdictions for establishing an exception to the at-will rule under
both contractual and tort theories of recovery.2 75  In contract causes
of action courts have found a breach of the "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, '2 76 while in tort actions courts have looked to
public policy to grant the benefit in question. 277 In applying either
theory of recovery, courts often fail to analyze whether there is in fact
a contractual right on the part of the discharged employee to the
denied benefit or whether the employer's policy was a mere gratuity.
part, at any time, with or without notice. The language used in this
handbook is not intended to create, nor is it to be construed to constitute, a
contract between General Motors and any one or all of its employes [sic].
79 Mich. App. at 95, 261 N.W.2d at 223.
Based on the foregoing disclaimers, the court of appeals in Kari held that the
handbook description of the employer's severance pay policy "clearly evinced an
intention not to create an offer capable of acceptance." 79 Mich. App. at 98, 261
N.W.2d at 224 (emphasis in original). The court reasoned that it was "difficult to
imagine what [the employer] could have done, short of not mentioning the plan, to
prevent the reading of its statement as an offer." 79 Mich. App. at 98, 261 N.W.2d at
224. The action in Kari, however, was remanded by the Michigan Supreme Court to
the trial court on the grounds that summary judgment was improperly granted
because triable issues of fact existed regarding, among other things, whether oral
promises to provide severance pay were made to the plaintiff. 402 Mich. at 926, 282
N.W.2d at 925. On remand, the trial court found that General Motors had complied
with the provisions of its handbook.
In Wittock v. General Motors Inst., Civ. No. 75-540062 (S.D. Mich., April 18,
1977), a federal court, in applying Michigan law, held that the same General Motors
handbook represented a unilateral offer to contract which plaintiff accepted by
remaining in the employ of that company, notwithstanding the presence of a dis-
claimer as to the employer's contractual obligations. The employee's continued serv-
ice, the court found, was sufficient evidence of reliance and made the offer irrevoca-
ble. Thus, the court held that the employee had a claim for breach of the lay-off and
recall guidelines in the handbook and denied the employer's motion for summary
judgment.
274. 102 Mich. App. at 614, 302 N.W.2d at 311.
275. See notes 126-32 supra and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); see notes 126-32 supra and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see
notes 170-74 supra and accompanying text.
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The following sections discuss the various principles upon which
courts have relied in determining whether at-will employees have a
contractual right to benefits set forth in personnel policies. 278  Al-
though this discussion focuses on certain benefits, it has equal applica-
tion to severence pay, bonuses, commissions, vacation pay, sick leave
and other fringe benefits. 279
A. Company Personnel Policies May Create an Implied in Fact Con-
tract Liability for Benefits Set Forth Therein
A company's adoption of a personnel policy relating to benefits for
employees may constitute an offer to make a unilateral contract in
employment-at-will situations provided that the offer is communi-
cated to the employees. An offer will be treated as being accepted by
the employees in question if they remain in the employ of a company
after they have received notice of the benefit policy.
Notice of a company's benefit policy may be disseminated to its
employees in a number of ways. Employees need not have examined
278. It has been held that benefit provisions contained in personnel policies may
be given the same interpretation as benefit provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments. See Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192,
197, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (1973) ("termination pay provisions are identically
construed whether contained in formal written agreements, such as collective bar-
gaining agreements, or a corporate personnel policy that becomes a part of the
understood employment agreement ...." (citations omitted)). It should be noted,
however, that benefit provisions appear to represent an exception to the general rule
that collective bargaining agreements are not governed strictly by the common law
contract principles which govern private employment contracts. In the landmark
case of Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960), the
Supreme Court recognized that a collective bargaining agreement "is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate." Towards that end, the Court stated that an interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement "is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract, as the industrial common law-the practices of the industry and the
shop-is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed
in it." Id. at 581-82.
279. New York Labor Law § 198-C, places upon an employer certain time limits
within which earned "benefits or wage supplements" must be provided to an em-
ployee. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198-C (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). Before the provisions of
§ 198-C become applicable, it must be established that the employer in question is a
party to an "agreement" to pay or provide such a benefit. Id. Section 195 of the
Labor Law, as amended, requires employers to notify all employees, in writing or by
publicly posting, "the employer's policy on sick leave, vacation, personal leave,
holidays and hours." N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). Under §
198-C, it is a misdemeanor if an employer who agrees to pay any fringe benefits fails
to do so. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198-C (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). Proof of the employer's
agreement is vital. Therefore, the requirement of § 195, that an employer publicize
an agreement or policy with regard to fringe benefits, prevents the denial of such
agreement as a defense.
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the actual policy in a personnel manual or some other employee
handbook prior to or during their employment with an employer in
order for there to be an offer capable of acceptance. Aside from
actually reading the policy, employees also may learn of a benefit
policy from company notices, from talking to other employees, or
from prior occasions where the benefits in question had been given to
eligible employees under similar circumstances. 280
Once the offer is made and communicated to the employees, their
continued employment is considered to be sufficient consideration for
the offer.28 ' It has been held to be immaterial whether the employees
would have continued their employment with a company even with-
out the offer of the benefit in question.282 As long as the benefit
policy contains language which creates an offer capable of accept-
ance, it will not be viewed as a mere gratuity payable at the discretion
of the employer.
An employer may, however, set the terms and conditions upon
which employees are entitled to receive personnel policy benefits.283
280. Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 502 (Mo. 1971). See also
Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976) (as long as employees
were aware of employer's written policy statement regarding severance pay, it was
irrelevant whether employees actually saw the statements). But cf. Alfaro v. Stauffer
Chem. Co., 173 Ind. App. 89, 362 N.E.2d 500 (1977) (court held that there was no
offer capable of acceptance where employer's written severance pay policy was
confidential and employer neither discussed policy with prospective employees nor
published it). See text accompanying notes 317-18 infra.
281. Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956);
accord, Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91
(1955); Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949).
Although continued employment may be sufficient consideration for an offer of
personnel policy benefits, it may not be sufficient to support a contract for perma-
nent employment. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. Forms of consideration
other than continued employment may support a promise for a benefit. In Griffith v.
Melbourn, 245 Ark. 40, 430 S.W.2d 862 (1968), the court found that where an
employee accepted the offer of severance pay in return for his promise not to protest
in the event he was discharged, there was sufficient consideration and the employee
was entitled to severance pay. Thus, an offer of severance pay merely requires an
employee to give up or forbear to exercise some legal right. Kolka v. Atlas Chem.
Indus., 13 Mich. App. 580, 164 N.W.2d 755 (1968).
282. Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d
762 (App. Div. 1958) (immaterial whether employees would have continued to work
for employer even without offer of severance pay); Hercules Powder Co. v. Brook-
field, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949) (the legal requirements of a contract are
satisfied as long as there is a promise of severance pay which is accepted by perform-
ance of the service); Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978) (severance pay was an implied in fact contract between the parties
so that question of reliance was not significant).
283. See 5 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS, § 1058 (1964):
[a]n agent's right to compensation can be made expressly conditional upon
the rendition of a specified performance by him. If the performance is not
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Courts have enforced provisions in personnel policies that employees
will lose their right to benefits if they are discharged for cause or quit
before the end of a specified time period. 284  Nevertheless, ambigui-
ties concerning the eligibility of employees to receive personnel policy
benefits usually are resolved against the employer. 285
B. Disclaimers May Clearly Evince an Intent Not to Create a Con-
tractual Offer
Once it is established that employees have had notice of a benefit
policy, it must be determined whether the policy is an offer to con-
tract or a mere gratuity. A benefit policy will not be viewed as a mere
gratuity unless the description of the policy contains language which
clearly evinces an intention not to create an offer capable of accept-
ance. For example, the following disclaimers have been held to evince
a clear intent not to create an offer capable of acceptance under the
facts of a particular case:
1. A booklet entitled "Know Your Company" which provided-
It has been customary, since 1937, for the company to make a
year end payment to employees. The amount of such payment, to
employees if any, depends upon the earnings available from opera-
tions, and is entirely at the discretion of the Board of Directors.28
2. A staff bulletin outlining a plan of renewal bonuses which
stated-
This renewal bonus is a voluntary contribution on the part of the
Company. It is agreed by you and by us that it may be'withheld,
rendered, his right to the compensation never arises. Such a provision is
not regarded as one that fixes a penalty for breach of duty; neither is it a
provision for liquidated damages. It is not impossible that in an extreme
case the court might be convinced that a provision seeming to create a
condition precedent to a primary right is put in that form as a camouflage
for a penalty clause; but the writer has seen no case of this sort.
See also Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327, 332, 509 P.2d 439, 441
(1973).
284. Brydges v. Coast Wide Land, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 223, 467 P.2d 209 (1970).
See also Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg., 573 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)
(discharged employee was not entitled to vacation pay under company policy requir-
ing employees to take vacation time in order to obtain benefit and prohibiting
payment of cash bonus in lieu of vacation).
285. See note 306 infra and accompanying text.
286. Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 188, 150 A.2d 607, 609
(1958). See also Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1974) (employer's
statement, "do a good job and you will get a good bonus," did not create an
enforceable contract where the granting of the bonus was clearly within the em-
ployer's discretion).
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increased, decreased or discontinued, individually or collectively,
with or without notice.287
and
3. A listing of "Suggestion System Rules" which contained the fol-
lowing-
Each suggestion is submitted with the understanding that the
Company shall have the right to publish, use or refuse it and that if
it is published or used, the decision of the Company shall be final
and conclusive as to the amount of a cash award, if any, and the
person or persons entitled thereto, and all other matters concerning
the suggestion.2 88
The crucial language in all of the foregoing disclaimers clearly
indicates that the employer in question was not making an offer to
contract, that the terms of the policies in question could be changed at
any time and for any reason with or without notice at management's
discretion, and that the employees under these policies did not have
any vested rights. Nevertheless, oral assurances of a term or condition
of employment may negate the effect of a disclaimer, thus creating a
contractually enforceable right. 289
C. Modification of Benefit Plans
It has been held that implied in fact contracts arising from employ-
ment-at-will relations may be modified, other than as to accrued
benefits, by either party at any time.2 90 In Gebhard v. Royce Alumi-
num Corp.,29 1 for example, a salesman sued his former employer for
certain commissions allegedly owed to him. The salesman who was
employed at-will received a specific commission for all accounts
which he obtained or serviced. During the course of employment, the
defendant modified the commission rates at which the salesman was
compensated, and the salesman continued to work for the defendant
287. Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 457, 287 P.2d 735, 737
(1955) (emphasis in original).
288. Calkins v. Boeing Co., 8 Wash. App. 347, 349, 506 P.2d 329, 330 (1973).
289. See Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307
(1981); Wittock v. General Motors Inst., Civ. No. 75-540062 (S.D. Mich., April 18,
1977). See notes 270-74 supra and accompanying text.
290. Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961); Swalley v.
Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 158 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 845 (1947); Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 143 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.
1944).
291. 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961).
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with knowledge of the lower rates. Subsequently, the defendant ter-
minated the salesman's employment.
The court disposed of the salesman's claims, holding that he was not
entitled to commissions on accounts which he neither obtained nor
serviced.292 In addition, the court found that the salesman had ac-
cepted the lower commission rates as a condition of his employment
even though he claimed that he had never agreed to them. The court
reasoned that the defendant could modify its agreement with him at
any time except as to accrued matters, because it had the right to
discharge the salesman at any time. The court noted: "Plaintiff's only
alternatives were to accept the new conditions or quit. . . .By contin-
uing to work, plaintiff, knowing the newly proposed terms, accepted
them as a matter of law. '2 93 Finally, the court held that the termina-
tion of the salesman's employment did not affect his right to receive
commissions on those accounts for which he obtained orders but
which were not filled until after the termination.2 94
Although an employer may modify a personnel policy, an employ-
ment contract cannot be changed to the detriment of an employee
without his knowledge. In Reading & Bates, Inc. v. Wittington,295 for
example, the defendant-employer arbitrarily and without notice
changed a term and condition of employment in order to avoid an
employee's workmen's compensation claim. Because the change was
made without notice and to the employee's detriment, the court held
that the defendant could not prevent the employee from recovering
workmen's compensation for his injury. 26
D. Promissory Estoppel May Entitle At-Will Employees to Receive
Personnel Policy Benefits
Courts have considered whether employees are entitled to receive
benefits set forth in personnel policies under the principle of promis-
292. Id. at 19.
293. Id.
294. Similarly, in Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804
(1949), the court recognized the right of a defendant-employer to discontinue a
severance pay plan for at-will employees but noted that the employer could not
deprive employees of severance pay "already earned as of the date of its discontinu-
ance." Id. at 543, 53 S.E.2d at 809. The court stated that such a result "would
constitute not mere discontinuance of the plan, but forfeiture of plaintiff's contrac-
tual rights amounting to a breach of the contract." Id. See also Berteau v. Wiener
Corp., 362 So. 2d .806 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (employer could not cause forfeiture of
vested vacation pay rights to former employee under unpublished policy of denying
the payment of benefits to non-employees).
295. 208 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1968).
296. Id. at 439.
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sory estoppel. In Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. 297 plaintiff retired from a
lucrative employment position in reliance upon the defendant-com-
pany's promise to pay her a pension of $200 a month for life. The
defendant subsequently stopped the pension payments claiming that
the resolution of its board of directors to make such payments was
only a mere promise to make a gift because there was no legal consid-
eration. The court held, however, that plaintiffs retirement from the
lucrative position in reliance upon the defendant's resolution, created
an enforceable promise which the defendant was estopped from deny-
ing.29 8
In Hilton v. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc.299 plaintiff sought to re-
cover severance pay on the theory of promissory estoppel even though
the defendant-employer's company manual made no mention of such
a benefit. Plaintiff knew that severance pay had been given to several
employees terminated when the company closed its Seattle office, but
the court concluded that other evidence negated plaintiffs contentions
that she was entitled to such pay under a theory of promissory estop-
pel. This evidence showed that company superiors had told plaintiff
that severance pay would not be paid to employees who were retained
after the closing of the Seattle office. Because plaintiff had been
retained by the defendant after the closing, she failed to establish any
basis for concluding that the company had promised its employees
severance pay under other circumstances. Accordingly, the principle
of promissory estoppel was not applied. 30 0
E. Severance Pay as an Enforceable Contract Right
1. Nature of Severance Pay
Severance pay is a prime example of a benefit which may induce an
at-will employee to continue his service with a particular employer.
Severance pay is neither analogous to nor a form of unemployment
compensation. 30 1 Rather, it has been characterized as "a kind of
297. 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959).
298. Id. at 168.
299. 66 Wash. 2d 30, 400 P.2d 772 (1965).
300. Id. at 31-32, 400 P.2d at 773-74.
301. Although severance pay has not generally been regarded as a form of unem-
ployment compensation, a number of states either have passed or are considering the
passage of legislation containing severance pay provisions designed to minimize the
impact on employees of plant closings and relocations. See generally Feerick, Devel-
opments in Employee Rights, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1. For example,
Maine has passed a law providing for 60 days pre-notification of a plant closing as
well as the payment of severance pay, at the rate of one week's pay for each year of
service, to affected employees. 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625-13 (1980). Other states
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accumulated compensation for past services and a material recogni-
tion of their past value .... It concerns the past, not the future, and
once it is earned, it becomes payable no matter what may thereafter
happen. ' 30 2  The rule has evolved that severance pay is not a mere
gratuity, but a unilateral contract offer which is accepted if an em-
ployee continues his employment with notice of the offer. 30 3  The
continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for the of-
fer. 0 4 Under this view, severance pay is an accrued or vested right
payable to eligible employees upon their termination of employment
with the employer in question .3 5
are considering the passage of laws containing provisions providing, in addition to
pre-notification and severance pay, for pensions, health care benefits, transfer rights,
job training and relocation expenses. See generally Advance Notice of Plant Closings:
Toward National Legislation, 14 J. OF L. REFORM 283 (1981).
302. Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192,
198-99, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 116 (1973); accord, Willets v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 152
Conn. 487, 490-91, 208 A.2d 546, 548 (1965); Adams v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light
Co., 21 N.J. 8, 120 A.2d 737 (1956). Where severance pay policies qualify as
"employee welfare benefit plan[s]" within the meaning of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976), employers have the
following fiduciary obligations under that Act:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;-and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;...
Id. § 1104(a)(1). In Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo.
1979), the court stated that an amendment of a severance pay plan by employers
"[s]o as to make employees otherwise eligible now ineligible, at a time when [the
employers] were contemplating a large layoff of otherwise eligible employees" would
be in violation of this fiduciary duty. Id. at 360-61.
303. See Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 99-100, 291
P.2d 91, 92 (1955); Hunter v. Sparling, 87 Cal. App. 2d 711, 197 P.2d 807 (1948);
Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680, 237 A.2d 360 (1967); Gaydos
v. White Motors Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 200 N.W.2d 697 (1974); Cain v. Allen
Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 579, 78 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1956); Anthony v.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co:, 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (App. Div. 1958);
Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949).
304. See Dulaney Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220 Va. 502, 260 S.E.2d 196 (1979), which
held that employees who continued to work for the employer after being advised of
the severance pay plan were entitled to severance pay after being terminated when
the employer's plant closed. The court recognized that severance pay is not a gratuity
but a matter of contract. It also found that there had been an offer by the employer
which the employees accepted by continuing to work and that the continued employ-
ment was sufficient consideration for the offer. This rationale was adopted from a
line of prior cases. See cases cited in note 303 supra. See also notes 281-82 supra for
a discussion of other forms of consideration to support offer of severance pay.
305. The court in Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442
(1956), reached the same conclusion in interpreting a collective bargaining agree-
ment by reasoning that the right to severance pay can only arise during the life of
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2. Eligibility of Employees to Receive Severance Pay
Even where a severance pay policy is found to be an offer capable
of acceptance, it still must be determined whether the employees in
question are eligible to receive severance pay under the express provi-
sions of the plan and the specific facts of the case. Because the em-
ployer is usually the draftsman of the severance pay policy, courts
routinely resolve any ambiguities in favor of the employee. 306  Most
severance pay policies designate the employees who are eligible under
the plan (for example, full-time salaried employees), and the condi-
tions which give rise to severance pay liability. The courts focus on
these conditions in determining whether employees are entitled to
receive severance pay.
Personnel manuals vary in their statement of the conditions under
which employees are entitled to severance pay. "Involuntary termina-
tion of employees due to lack of work," 30 7 "permanent reduction of
staff," 30 8 and "termination for reasons outside the control of the em-
such an agreement, but that "once the right thus comes into being it will survive the
termination of the agreement. Discharge from service during the term of the contract
is not a condition sine qua non to the enforcement of the accrued right." 20 N.J. at
548, 120 A.2d at 448.
In certain states an employer's failure to pay severance benefits also may result in
criminal liability. For example, the Labor and Industrial Relations Law of Missouri
provides:
Any employer who promises in writing to make payments to an employee
retirement or welfare plan, either by contract with an individual em-
ployee, by a collective bargaining agreement, or by agreement with the
employee retirement or welfare plan, and who willfully fails to make the
payment within sixty days after they become due and payable is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 285.100 (Vernon Supp. 1979). The definition of "employee
retirement or welfare plan" includes severance pay plans within the meaning of the
Missouri statute. Id. § 285.105; see note 279 supra for a discussion of New York law.
306. Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 500 (Mo. 1971); Langdon
v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okl. App. 1976). Ambiguous provisions regarding
the payment of bonuses have been similarly construed in favor of the employee. See,
e.g., Fujimoto v. Rio Grande Pickle Co., 414 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969). See also J.
CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 2-25 (2d ed. 1977). But cf. Ridenhour v.
Mollinan Pub., 66 I11. App. 3d 1049, 383 N.E.2d 803 (1978) (provision in severance
pay plan that "in event of suspension all employees shall receive severance pay"
construed to mean that only employees who did not commit acts of wrongdoing or
dishonesty were eligible to receive severance pay); Bravin v. Fashion Week, Inc., 75
Misc. 2d 753, 348 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973) (court interpreted
severance pay provision to mean that an employee would not be entitled to severance
pay if discharged for a material breach of the employment contract).
307. Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192, 195,
107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 113 (1973).
308. Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680, 237 A.2d 360 (1967).
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ployee, ' ' 30 9 are several examples of the key phrases used in severance
pay policies. Although these phrases have been interpreted in light of
a variety of factual situations, their meaning has been most clearly
construed in asset divestment cases.
A number of jurisdictions have considered the issue of whether
employees have been involuntarily terminated within the meaning of
a severance pay policy when their employer has sold its assets to
another company and the employees "continue" in the employ of the
purchasing company. 310  The courts in these jurisdictions uniformly
agree that the sale of an employer's business constitutes a termination
of the employment relationship between the seller-employer and its
employees. It is immaterial, therefore, whether these employees con-
tinue to work at their same jobs for the purchasing employer without
sustaining loss of employment or income.3 11  Moreover, even when
severance pay eligibility depends on the requirement that no "other
suitable opening" be available to an employee seeking severance pay,
such an opening has been held to refer to job vacancies with the
seller-employer and not to openings with any other employer. 312 Ac-
cordingly, the significant factor in these cases is whether there has
309. Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 211 N.W.2d 101 (1973).
310. See Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192,
107 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1973); Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680,
237 A.2d 360 (1967); Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 211 N.W.2d
101 (1973); Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971); Anthony
v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (App. Div.
1958).
311. See, e.g., Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d
192, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1973); Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn.
680, 237 A.2d 360 (1967).
Although there is a dearth of case law in this area, it appears that a transfer of a
corporation's stock may not be considered a "termination" of employment within the
meaning of a severance pay plan where the only effect of such a transfer is a change
in the ownership of the corporation's stock. Based on circumstances similar to the
foregoing, a federal court in Hover v. IBM Corp., Civ. No. 6-71730 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 30, 1977), granted the defendant-stockholder's motion for a summary judgment
against two employees of one of its former subsidiaries. The employees in question
had claimed that the sale of the subsidiary stock by the defendant-stockholder (i.e.,
IBM) to Control Data Corporation constituted a termination of their employment
with the defendant and thus entitled them to receive lost benefits, severance pay and
other damages. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court stated, "The frivolity of
plaintiffs' lawsuit is highlighted by their continued status as employees of S.D.C.
[i.e., the former subsidiary of IBM]." The court noted that the employees were
employed by S.D.C. prior to the sale of stock and that they were still in the employ of
that company at the time of trial; thus, the employees' employment with S.D.C. had
never been terminated. The court also rejected the claims that IBM had somehow
adopted a policy of granting severance pay in similar situations.
312. Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667, 211 N.W.2d 101 (1973).
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been an involuntary termination of employment with the seller and
not whether there is an actual loss of employment or income. 313
An agreement between the seller-employer and a purchaser
whereby the purchaser assumes the seller's severance pay liability to
its employees is often viewed as an ineffective attempt at making a
novation. 31 4 In order to establish an effective novation, it must be
shown that the employees claiming severance pay had accepted the
purchaser as their new debtor and that they had discharged the seller's
obligation of severance pay. 31 5 Accordingly, a novation has not been
found even where employees remained on the same job, received
substantially the same terms and conditions of employment from the
purchaser, and had their accrued severance pay rights recognized by
the purchaser. In Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc.3 16 a Connect-
icut court concluded that a novation had not been created, where
there was no evidence presented to show that the employees involved
had given their consent either to accept their new employer as the
new debtor for their severance pay obligations or to discharge their
former employer from these obligations.
Seller-employers have not, however, been obligated to provide sev-
erance pay to their former employees in sale of asset divestments
where their severance pay policies were not considered to be contrac-
tual offers capable of acceptance and the employees did not suffer any
loss of employment as a result of the sale. For example, in Alfaro v.
Stauffer Chemical Co., 317 an Indiana appellate court held that the
defendant-seller's severance pay policy "was a voluntary gratuitous
benefit," because it was contained in a confidential manual which
was not disseminated to its employees. Moreover, the court noted that
the defendant had only granted severance pay in the past where
employees, unlike the plaintiffs, had been terminated following the
sale of a plant. Accordingly, the court found that the severance pay
policy was not part of the contractual relationship between the de-
fendant and the plaintiffs. 318
313. Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192, 107
Cal. Rptr. 111 (1973).
314. See, e.g., Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d
192, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1973); Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn.
680, 237 A.2d 360 (1967).
315. Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680, 237 A.2d 360 (1967).
316. Id.
317. 173 Ind. App. 89, 362 N.E.2d 500 (1977).
318. Id. at 92-93, 362 N.E.2d at 503-04. The defendant's policy regarding sever-
ance pay was set forth in a manual which was only distributed to managerial
personnel. In its application of the severance pay policy, the defendant had previ-
ously granted such pay in cases "where there were plant shut downs and no continua-
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F. Contractual Rights to Bonuses
Courts have differed over the requisite consideration needed to
support a promise to pay a bonus, because receipt of this benefit is
often made contingent upon the satisfaction of certain conditions.
Most courts agree that where bonuses are offered as an inducement for
continued employment, an employee's continued services in reliance
upon such an offer constitutes sufficient consideration to enforce the
promise. 319  Under other circumstances, however, courts have held
that bonus plans or the regular payment of bonuses to employees must
be supported by additional and separate consideration in order to be
tion of employment. However, where there was a sale of a plant as a going concern
with no break in the continuity of employment, severance pay was deemed inappli-
cable." Id. at 93, 352 N.E.2d at 503-04. Moreover, none of the plaintiffs testified at
trial that they had continued their employment with the defendant in reliance on a
promise of severance pay. Id. at 93-94, 362 N.E.2d at 504.
Similarly, in Albertson v. Ralston Purina Co., 586 S.W.2d 776 (Mo. App. 1979),
plaintiff-employees who continued in the purchaser's employ did not have a claim for
severance pay where the defendant's severance pay policy was determined on a
case-by-case basis and "paid only in limited and exceptional cases" involving an
actual loss of employment. 586 S.W.2d at 779 (emphasis in original). The severance
pay policy of the defendant provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is the policy of Ralston Purina Company to grant, in limited and
exceptional cases, a gratuity to a separated employee. 'rhe purpose of this
gratuity is to assist the former employee during a period of financial need
as he bridges the gap between his former employment and his future
employment.
Id. at 777 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs also alleged that, in addition to severance pay, they had been granted the
right to purchase stock after their termination. The defendant's stock purchase policy
provided that employees would receive one additional share of stock for every four
they purchased. Based on the defendant's mandatory retirement age of 65, plaintiffs'
claimed that they had a right to purchase stock until they reached that age. Id. at
778. In dismissing this claim, the court noted that provisions of the defendant's stock
purchase policy were limited to employees of Purina and there were no provisions
allowing former employees to avail themselves of this right. Id. at 780.
319. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Lindquist, 40 Ill. App. 3d 152, 351 N.E.2d 280 (1976)
(bonus for continued employment is enforceable if employee is not already bound by
contract for the extended period, i.e., employment was at-will); Newberger v.
Rifkind, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1070, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1972) (bonus is offer of unilateral
contract which is accepted if employee continues in employment); Brydges v. Coast
Wide Land, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 223, 467 P.2d 209 (1970) (employee's continued
employment was sufficient consideration to support bonus offer); Thatcher v. Wa-
satch Chem. Co., 29 Utah 2d 189, 507 P.2d 365 (1973) (where employer had a policy
to pay conservative salary and augment it with annual bonuses determined by
employer's profits, employee's continued employment with expectation of annual
bonuses was sufficient consideration to receive bonus in year that employer had large
net profits).
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an enforceable contract right. 320  Without such consideration, these
courts have held that a promise to pay a bonus is a mere gratuity to
which an at-will employee is not entitled upon discharge.321
In Leone v. Precision Plumbing & Heating of Southern Arizona,
Inc.322 plaintiff-employee brought a breach of contract action based
on an alleged oral promise that he "would receive a bonus of one-half
of the difference between the estimated and actual cost of a construc-
tion project. ' 323  In affirming the judgment for plaintiff, the court
held that the defendant's alleged promise of the bonus was supported
by sufficient consideration. Although the court found that the defend-
ant had bargained for plaintiff's "extra efforts" in order to receive the
bonus, it concluded that plaintiff's "staying on the job attempting to
gain the bonus constituted consideration supporting the bonus agree-
ment. "324
The regular payment of bonuses by an employer may constitute a
past practice giving rise to an implied contractual obligation to con-
tinue the payment of the bonuses. In Simon v. Riblet Tramway
320. See, e.g., Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969) (in absence of contract or agreement, bonus without return promise
by employees is a gratuity); Church v. Harnit, 35 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 732 (1930) (for employee to receive additional compensation or
bonus, he must supply valuable services as consideration); Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co.
v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1327 (Ala. 1977) (employer's promise to pay bonus upon
a condition is not enforceable unless the condition is performed); Meyerson v. New
Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1927) (to be enforceable, employer's
promise to pay bonus must be conditioned upon the doing of an act, the act must be
performed and there must be sufficient consideration); Management Search, Inc. v.
Morgan, 136 Ga. App. 651, 222 S.E.2d 154 (1975) (promise to pay bonus after
parties had entered into a written contract establishing compensation was unenforce-
able where no change in hours, extra services, additional consideration was given).
See generally Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 1075 (1975); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 503 (1972).
321. See, e.g., Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Wittler, 509 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974) (employer frustrated employee's eligibility for bonus by discharging him 27
days before employee would have been entitled to such bonus); cf. Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (employer dis-
charged employee in bad faith to prevent him from obtaining certain commissions).
See also Sarama v. John Mee, Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 132, 422 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (past consideration sufficient to support employer's promise
of Christmas bonus).
322. 121 Ariz. 514, 591 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1979).
323. Id. at 515, 591 P.2d at 1003.
324. Id. at 515-16, 591 P.2d at 1003-04. In addition to the oral bonus agreement,
plaintiff's employment with the defendant was governed by a collective bargaining
agreement. The defendant claimed that a private contract, such as the bonus agree-
ment, between an employer and employee subject to a collective bargaining act
violated the public policy underlying the NLRA. The court found that the defendant
had waived this defense by not affirmatively pleading it as a defense and because the
bonus agreement was not illegal on its face. Id. at 516, 591 P.2d at 1004.
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Co., 325 for example, a Washington court found that the payment of a
bonus over a ten-year period created an implied contractual obliga-
tion where the bonus constituted a substantial part of plaintiff's total
compensation, even though the amount of the bonus was discretion-
ary, not bargained for, and contingent upon the defendant's
profits.32 6  Similarly, in Thatcher v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 327 the
Supreme Court of Utah held that an employer's past practice of
paying an annual bonus to deserving employees based on the com-
pany's annual income and profits created implied contractual rights
where plaintiffs continued their employment with the understanding
that their salaries would be augmented by such a bonus. 328
As with other benefits, a written disclaimer may relieve an em-
ployer of its obligation to pay a bonus otherwise earned, if it clearly
evinces an intention not to create an offer capable of acceptance. In
the absence of an effective disclaimer, however, an employer cannot
unilaterally revoke a bonus plan once an employee begins perform-
ance with knowledge of that plan. 329  Courts have upheld provisions
in bonus plans or employment contracts providing that an employee
will lose an earned bonus if he quits, is discharged with cause or
otherwise fails to satisfy a required condition for that benefit. 330  An
employer also may provide that an employee will lose his right to a
325. 8 Wash. App. 289, 505 P.2d 1291, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973).
326. 8 Wash. App. at 293, 505 P.2d at 1293. In reaching its decision; the court
noted that plaintiff-employee's salary was $8,858.28, while the bonus was $6,000. It
relied on Powell v. Republic Creosoting Co., 172 Wash. 155, 19 P.2d 919 (1933),
where the bonus constituted up to 63% of the employee's stated salary. See also
SCOA Industries, Inc. v. Branchen, 374 A.2d 263 (Del. 1977) (court specifically held
that a year-end bonus amounted to "wages" under a Delaware statute-DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19 § 1101(a)(2) (1974)-which defined "wages" as including commissions or
other forms of compensation).
327. 29 Utah 2d 189, 507 P.2d 365 (1973).
328. Id. at 191, 507 P.2d at 366.
329. See, e.g., Calkins v. Boeing Co., 8 Wash. App. 347, 349, 506 P.2d 329, 330
(1973); see generally Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 150 A.2d
607 (1958).
330. See, e.g., Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1971)
(employee who quit lost undistributed portion of previously awarded bonuses, but
employee who is involuntarily terminated without cause is entitled to bonus); Keef-
ner v. Super X Drugs of Ill. Inc., 21111. App. 3d 394, 315 N.E.2d 35 (1974) (provision
in employment contract that employee would lose bonus if discharged with cause or
quits); Tobin v. General Motors Corp., 17 Mich. App. 475, 169 N.W.2d 644 (1969)
(employee who quit to work for rival auto manufacturer lost bonus where employer's
stock option and bonus plan provided that employee would lose bonus if he engaged
in competitive activities); Walker v. American Optical Corp., 265 Or. 327, 509 P.2d
439 (1973) (employee who quit was not entitled to semi-annual bonus under em-
ployer's "sales incentive plan").
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bonus if he quits or is discharged for cause before the specific date on
which the bonus is fully accrued or is otherwise payable. 331
In Lucian v. All States Trucking Co. 332 plaintiff-employees who
were voluntarily retired executives of the defendant-company sought
to receive a pro-rata share of the defendant's profits under company
bonus "incentive plans." For certain employees, this bonus was pay-
able in full at the end of the calendar year and subject to the following
provision:
An employee who voluntarily leaves the Company will not be
entitled to any further or year end payments under the Plan. 333
The plans also provided that employees discharged by the company or
transferred to another location before the bonus calculation date
would receive a pro-rata share of the incentive bonus. The court
rejected plaintiffs' claims that the provisions of the incentive plans
were ambiguous and held that it was "the prevailing view that where
a definite bonus or profit-sharing plan has been established and forms
part of the employment contract, the employee is not entitled to share
in the proceeds where he leaves the employment voluntarily. . .334
prior to the date on which the bonus becomes payable. The court
concluded that the incentive plans were not offered as an inducement
for continued employment and, as such, did not fall within an excep-
tion to this general rule. 335
A similar result was reached in Compton v. Shopko Stores Inc.,330
where an executive employee was deprived of a bonus because he had
been discharged for good cause prior to the eligibility date for the
331. See, e.g., Lucian v. All States Trucking Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 972, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 262 (1981) (employer not liable where employee quit before date on which
bonus was payable); Brydges v. Coast Wide Land, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 223, 467 P.2d
209 (1970) (employment contract may provide that bonus is lost if employee quits or
is discharged before the end of specific time period in which bonus is payable).
332. 116 Cal. App. 3d 972, 171 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1981).
333. Id. at 974, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 263. Other employees were subject to the
following provision: "An employee who voluntarily leaves the Company will receive
his incentive check providing he works the entire accounting period following the
period in which his check was earned." Id. Bonuses subject to this provision were
partially payable at the end of the quarter with the balance due at the end of the
year.
334. Id. at 975-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 264, citing Peterson v. California Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 80 Cal. App. 2d 827, 183 P.2d 56 (1947) and Kassab v. Ragnar Benson,
Inc., 254 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
335. 116 Cal. App. 3d at 976, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 264, citing Chinn v. China Nat'l
Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955) (benefits create enforceable
rights where they are part of the inducement offered to an employee for his initial or
continued employment).
336. 93 Wis. 2d 613, 287 N.W.2d 720 (1980).
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bonus.3 37 Under the employer's non-contributory "executive bonus
plan," qualified executives were required to be employed at the end of
the fiscal year in order to share in the company's profits. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that the executive was not entitled to the
bonus because his employment was terminated for good cause, he
performed no services for the employer after the date of his discharge,
and his receipt of severance pay on the last day of the fiscal year did
not extend his employment to that date for the purposes of the bonus
plan. 338
G. Commissions
As a general rule, commissions are considered to be earned when a
sales order is accepted or otherwise placed with an employer. 33  An
employee's right to an earned commission is not affected by a deferral
in the payment of the commission until the date of shipment of the
sales order 340 or by the employee's termination of employment prior to
the consummation of the transaction in question. 341 Nevertheless, the
parties to an at-will relationship may alter the general rule that a
commission is earned when an order is placed, by agreeing either in
writing or by conduct, to a different compensation scheme. 342
Commission rates may be unilaterally modified by employers in
at-will situations, provided that notice of the changed rates is given to
the affected employees. Where employees have received notice of a
modification in their commission rates, their only alternatives are to
337. The executive was discharged because "his performance was substandard,"
he" '[lacked leadership qualities,' " and the sales of his department were below the
company's budget. Id. at 618, 287 N.W.2d at 722.
338. Id. at 619-21, 287 N.W.2d at 723-24. The Compton court, in support of its
holding, cited several other cases which also have held that employees discharged for
cause prior to the eligibility date for a bonus are not entitled to receive that benefit.
Id. at 627, 287 N.W.2d at 727, citing Croskey v. Kroger Co., 259 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
App. 1953); Molburg v. Hunter Hosiery, Inc., 102 N.H. 422, 158 A.2d 288 (1960);
Watwood v. Potomac Chem. Co., 57 N.J. 631, 42 A.2d 728 (1945).
339. See, e.g., Oken v. National Chain Co., - R.I. __, 424 A.2d 234, 235
(1981).
340. See, e.g., Richer v. Khoury Bros., Inc., 341 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1965) (applying
Illinois law); Weick v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co., 134 Colo. 283, 303 P.2d 685
(1956); Oken v. National Chain Co., - R.I. -, 424 A.2d 234 (1981). See generally
9 S. WILLISTON, CONTrCrS, § 1017C (3d ed. 1967).
341. See, e.g., Calvo v. Calhoon, 559 P.2d 111 (Alas. 1977); Peach State Ford
Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 151 Ga. App. 7, 258 S.E.2d 678 (1979); Lundeen v. Cozy
Cab Mfg. Co., 288 Minn. 98, 179 N.W.2d 73 (1970).
342. Keneally v. Orgain, - Mont. -, 606 P.2d127 (1980); Oken v. National
Chain Co., - R.I. -, 424 A.2d 234 (1981).
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accept the new rates or quit.3 43 Employees who continue their em-
ployment with notice of a modification are deemed to have accepted
the changed rates. 34 4 The employee's continued services constitute
the requisite consideration needed to support the modification. 345
In Oken v. National Chain Co. 346 the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island held that an at-will salesman's continued employment after
receiving notice of a modification in his commission rates on May 8,
1974 constituted an acceptance of the changed rates, even where the
changes in question were made effective retroactive to January 1,
1974. Citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 347 the court
found that there was no evidence of bad faith or coercion by the
defendant in effectuating the modification, because the defendant's
decision was "a business judgment based upon a dramatic increase in
the price of metals." 34  The Oken court did hold, however, that the
salesman was entitled to commissions for sale orders made prior to his
departure from the defendant's company, even though the goods were
shipped and paid for after his last date of employment.3 49
The right to commissions also may be made subject to "forfeiture
for competition" clauses. This type of provision, unlike anti-competi-
tive covenants, provides for the forfeiture of a benefit should the
employee decide to work for a competitor of his employer and is, in
effect, a condition precedent to an employee's entitlement to a com-
mission. 350  Anti-competitive covenants, on the other hand, seek to
343. See, e.g., Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961);
Oken v. National Chain Co., - R.I. -, 424 A.2d 234 (1981); but see Simpson v.
Norwesco, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1102 (D.S.D. 1977) (modification of written commis-
sion schedule required mutual consent).
344. Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961); Oken v.
National Chain Co., - R.I. -, 424 A.2d 234 (1981).
345. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 136 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 135A (3d ed. 1957).
346. - R.I. -, 424 A.2d 234 (1981).
347. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); for a discussion of Fortune, see notes
126-32 supra and accompanying text.
348. - R.I. at -, 424 A.2d at 237.
349. 424 A.2d at 235-36. The court stated that if the defendant wanted to make
plaintiff's right to commissions contingent upon the shipment of goods, "it could have
provided for such a contingency in clear and unambiguous language." Id. Moreover,
the court noted that the defendant's practice of paying plaintiff his commissions at
the time of shipment was merely a manifestation of its accounting procedures. Id. at
236, citing Weick v. Rickenbaugh, 134 Colo. 283, 288-89, 303 P.2d 685, 688 (1956).
350. See, e.g., Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975);
Shandor v. Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Sheppard v.
Columbus Packaging Co., 146 Ga. App. 202, 245 S.E.2d 887 (1978); Kristt v.
Whelan, 4 A.D.2d 195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1957), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 155
N.E.2d 116, 181 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1958).
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prevent employees from directly competing with their employers both
during and after the term of employment within a specified time
period and area. 35 1 Courts have not enforced either type of provision,
however, where it constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade.35 2
The distinction between forfeiture for competition clauses and anti-
competitive covenants was relied on by the court in Shandor v. Wells
National Service Corp. ,35 where plaintiff-salesman's claims for com-
missions for sales made prior to his resignation were denied. Under the
terms of his employment with the defendant, plaintiff was subject to
the following "Ground Rules" provision:
In the event of early retirement, Resignation or Termination and
subsequent employment by a competitor, no further compensations
will be paid after the date of such employment.1 4
Plaintiff, who had voluntarily left the employ of the defendant to
work for a competitor, claimed that this provision was an unlawful
restrictive convenant not to compete, because it was " 'too general as
to time and territory and. . . impose[d] too great a restriction in that
the plaintiff [was] forbidden to work in any capacity for a competi-
tor.' ",355 In rejecting plaintiff's claims, the Shandor court character-
ized the "Ground Rules" provision as a valid forfeiture clause and not
as an unduly restrictive anti-competitive covenant. Citing cases which
recognized the distinction between the two types of provisions, 35 the
court upheld the "Ground Rules" provision as a lawful condition
precedent to plaintiff's right to receive commissions.
Various standards have been used by courts in determining whether
forfeiture clauses were unreasonable restraints on trade.35 7  Aside
351. See, e.g., Shandor v. Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp., 478 F. SUpp. 12 (N.D. Ga.
1979); Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., - Mass. -, 385 N.E.2d 961
(1979); Chemical Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska, 542 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1976).
352. See notes 353-65 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the validity
of forfeiture clauses. Most jurisdictions will uphold anti-competitive covenants if they
are reasonable as to time and area limitations. Nevertheless, such covenants are
generally disfavored in the law because they tend to restrict competition. See gener-
ally Shandor v. Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 12, 14 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
353. 478 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
354. Id. at 13. (emphasis in original).
355. Id. at 14.
356. Id. at 14-15, citing Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.
1975); Sheppard v. Columbus Packaging Co., 146 Ga. App. 202, 245 S.E.2d 887
(1978); Brown Stove Works, Inc. v. Kimsey, 119 Ga. App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 693
(1969).
357. See generally Comment, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for Violation of Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 290 (1966); 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
1396 (1962); 14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1643 (3d ed. 1972).
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from the statutory limitations on these clauses, 358 the majority view
appears to be that forfeiture clauses are enforceable without regard to
the reasonableness of the restraint on the affected employee.359 Some
courts, however, have utilized a reasonableness test based on the
circumstances of the parties' relationship to enforce forfeiture clauses
only to the extent that they are reasonable, 360 while others have held
that unreasonably broad clauses are invalid and not subject to judicial
modification . 36 1
In Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America 362 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted the reasonableness test to
determine the validity of forfeiture clauses by stating that it "would
enforce a forfeiture of deferred compensation only to the extent the
restraint is reasonable. ' 3 3 Among the factors which the court said it
would consider in making such a determination are the "amount and
nature of the forfeiture and the nature of the employee's duties and
responsibilities in his former and current employment . .. 6364 The
court noted that it had previously used the same standards to enforce
anti-competitive covenants "only to the extent that the restraint is
reasonable in time and place and necessary to protect the former
employer's trade secrets, confidential information, or good will. ' 365
358. The provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §
105 3 (a) (1976), for example, have been interpreted to prohibit the forfeiture of
accrued retirement benefits where an employee goes to work for a competitor. See,
e.g., Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1977); Cheney v. Auto-
matic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., - Mass. -, 385 N.E.2d 961, 964 n.5 (1979).
359. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971);
Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976);
see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968).
360. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632
(1972); Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., - Mass. -, 385 N.E.2d 961
(1979); Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Or. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973).
361. See, e.g., Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank of Charleston, 265 S.C. 48,
217 S.E.2d 135 (1975); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265, 120
N.W.2d 126 (1963).
362. - Mass. -, 385 N.E.2d 961 (1979).
363. - Mass. at -, 385 N.E.2d at 965 (footnote omitted).
364. Id. In Cheney plaintiff-salesman claimed that he was entitled to certain
incentive payments and bonuses under his compensation agreement with the defend-
ant. The agreement in question provided in pertinent part:
One who is discharged for cause, terminates his employment, joins a
competitor, or engages in activities which are harmful to the Corporation,
will Jorfeit all installments which remain unpaid on the date of the occur-
rence of any of such events.
Id. at 963 (emphasis added). Based on its adoption of the reasonableness test, the
Cheney court allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege facts establishing
that the provision in question was an unreasonable restraint on him. Id. at 966.
365. Id. at 965, citing New England Canteen Serv. Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671,
363 N.E.2d 526 (1977).
EMPLOYMENT-A T-WILL RULE
IX. Conclusion
Despite the continued adherence to the at-will rule, considerations
of public policy appear to warrant the recognition of exceptions to
that rule where employees are discharged for promoting a public
interest to the disadvantage of their employers. The difficulties, how-
ever, in adopting a well defined exception based on such consider-
ations are readily apparent. Courts, in an attempt to establish the
parameters of the public policy exception, have examined various
criteria without reaching an accord on a standard definition. Some
courts, for example, have sought to limit the application of this excep-
tion to violations of clear mandates of public policy as expressed in
federal or state law, while others have decided on a case-by-case basis
whether general considerations of public policy were somehow of-
fended by a particular discharge. On the other hand, the majority of
jurisdictions have either rejected or declined to adopt such limitations
on the at-will rule irrespective of the public interests involved.
The divergent views of the courts with respect to the limitations on
the at-will rule have failed to establish a uniform approach toward
balancing the interests of parties to employment relationships with
considerations of public policy. This failure in itself contravenes the
public policy expressed in federal and state law of promoting harmo-
nious labor relations in the best interests of the economic system as
well as the public welfare. The establishment, however, of a public
policy exception does not require the abandonment, in whole or sub-
stantial part, of the at-will rule. As certain courts have recognized,
there are equally important considerations for preserving that rule in
order to allow employers to operate their businesses efficiently and
profitably. Discharges of employees in retaliation for promoting pub-
lic interests or availing themselves of statutory rights would not be
among these considerations.
Moreover, the adoption of a public policy exception should not be
in effect the creation of a "just cause" standard. Such a standard has
invariably been a contractual right and not an expression of public
policy. Indeed, the provisions of the NLRA and Title VII have been
interpreted to allow employers to discharge without cause, provided
that the mandates of these laws were not somehow violated. Although
most collective bargaining agreements contain "just cause" limitations
on the right of employers to discharge summarily, the adoption of
these limitations has been the result of collective bargaining rather
than statutory mandate. In any event, at-will employees also may
have a contractual right to a "just cause" termination where they have
continued their employment in reliance upon an assurance of job
security.
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In adopting a uniform approach to wrongful discharge cases, courts
should first examine the terms and conditions of the at-will relation-
ship as defined by the agreement of the parties to determine if the
matter can be resolved without resort to considerations of public
policy. Courts should, therefore, decide whether an at-will employee
is entitled to a "just cause" termination under his employer's personnel
policies or, where deprivation of a benefit is claimed, whether the
employee has a contractual right to the benefit in question. Where
employees do have contractual rights to job security or benefits, courts
should not allow employers to deprive employees of these rights in bad
faith. In the absence of such contractual obligations, however, the
at-will rule should remain intact.
In cases which cannot be resolved by the agreement of the parties,
the courts should look to federal or state statutes to see whether they
provide adequate remedies for the discharged employee. Where statu-
tory remedies are available, courts should not usurp the legislative
function by allowing a private cause of action. In this regard, courts
should be wary of employees who seek to avoid an available statutory
cause of action by suing at common law after the relevant statute of
limitations has expired.
In the absence of statutory remedies, the courts should utilize the
public policy exception to determine whether a particular discharge
was in contravention of the public welfare. In adopting the public
policy exception, however, courts should recognize overriding public
interests which warrant the limitation of the ability of all employers,
not just those in at-will relationships, to discharge employees summar-
ily in contravention of the public welfare. Based on the apparent
difficulties in defining public policy, courts should limit such an ex-
ception to clearly articulated public interests as expressed in federal or
state law. Courts should not formulate public policy on an ad hoc
basis, thereby unduly restricting both employers and employees in the
exercise of their respective rights. Rather, the establishment of public
policy limitations on the right of employers to discharge employees
summarily should be a function of federal and state legislatures.
A uniform approach to wrongful discharge cases would accomplish
a dual purpose: it would preserve the at-will rule and give employers
the freedom to control their businesses, while affording employees a
measure of protection against wrongful discharges. Moreover, the
recognition of an express public policy exception would reconcile the
interests of the public with the interests of the parties in employment
relationships.
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